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NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF GUARANTY CONTRACTS 
Richard F. Dole, Jr.* 
T HERE are three types of notice which a creditor-offeree may be required to give a guarantor-offeror: (1) notice of intention to 
accept the offer of guaranty, (2) notice of transactions in reliance on 
the offer of guaranty, and (3) notice of the principal's failure to per-
form the obligation guaranteed. Litigation has been rife with re-
gard to these notice requirements. Corbin has stated: 
"The question of notice as a condition precedent has been 
litigated more extensively in connection with contracts of sure-
tyshi p than in any other field. A superficial examination of 
hundreds of cases may seem to indicate a tremendous conflict 
of authority. It is believed, however, that a careful analysis and 
classification of the cases will bring order out of chaos and will 
show that the courts have been acting with a reasonable degree 
of uniformity and consistency."1 
Corbin, however, did not attempt to analyze and classify the cases. 
The following is an attempt to verify Corbin's educated guess 
through the application of factual analysis. If significant facts can 
be isolated which produce the same result regardless of the theory 
applied by the court, no real conflict can be said to exist. An initial 
exploration of the problems involved is a prerequisite to delineat-
ing the area in which factual analysis must be used. 
I. SURVEY OF THE PROBLEM 
Contractual guaranties arise from dealings between the guaran-
tor and the creditor. They may exist without the consent, or even 
the knowledge, of the principal.2 Although the creditor frequently 
requests a guaranty,3 his solicitation seldoms amounts to an offer. 
The contract commonly results from acceptance by the creditor of 
• Member of the Maine and New York Bars.-Ed. The author is indebted to Professor 
Rudolf B. Schlesinger and the 1961 Seminar of the General Principles of Law Project at 
the Cornell Law School for encouragement in the preparation of this article, which was 
submitted to the faculty of the Cornell Law School in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the LL.M. degree. 
1 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 726, at 393-94 (1960) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN; Vol. 1 
(1950); Vol. 3A (1960)]. 
2 Sec REsrATEMENT, SECURITY § 83, comment b (1941). 
8 See Campbell, Notice Due a Guarantor, 35 MICH. L. R.Ev. 529, 535 (1937) [hereinafter 
cited as Campbell]. 
[57] 
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an offer made by the guarantor.4 It may be bilateral or unilateral, 
though bilateral contracts of guaranty are rare. 5 
An offer for a bilateral contract of guaranty may request the 
creditor to promise the guarantor that he will or will not act with 
respect to the principal. For example, the creditor may be asked to 
promise not to press the principal on a debt. The creditor may be 
expressly directed by the offer to give notice to the guarantor as a 
condition precedent to formation of a bilateral contract or as a 
condition subsequent to its existence. On the other hand, such 
notice may be expressly dispensed with by the offer. When the offer 
does not refer to notice, principles relating to the formation and 
discharge of contracts provide a solution. Communication of the 
creditor's promise to the guarantor is ordinarily necessary to form 
a bilateral contract of guaranty.6 Notice of the creditor's perform-
ance of his promise or of the principal's failure to pay him is not 
needed to prevent discharge of the contract. 
Similarly, an offer for a unilateral contract of guaranty may 
specify as consideration action or inaction by the creditor or a 
promise by the creditor running to the principal. For example, 
the creditor may be asked to extend credit to the principal or to 
promise the principal that he will do so. The creditor may be ex-
pressly charged by the offer to send notice to the guarantor as a 
condition precedent to formation of a unilateral contract or as a 
condition subsequent to its existence. Conversely, such notice may 
be expressly negatived by the offer. When the offer does not men-
tion notice, principles relating to the formation and discharge of 
contracts furnish an answer. The creditor need not communicate 
to the guarantor his intention to perform the requested act in 
order to create a unilateral contract of guaranty.7 Neither notice of 
the creditor's performance nor notice of the principal's default is 
essential to forestall the contract's discharge. 
When the offer is silent concerning notice, conventional prin-
ciples have not always been followed. At times the creditor has been 
compelled to give the guarantor notice in order to bind him to his 
promise. At other times no notice has been required. 
4 See 1 CORBIN § 68, at 215. 
5 See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 69A, at 221-22 (3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as 
WILLISTON]. 
6 See 1 WILLISTON § 70. 
7 See id. § 68. 
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A. Nature of the Notice Requirements 
All three notice requirements are conditions of the guarantor's 
liability. They are not promises creating a legal duty in the creditor 
and a right in the guarantor. They are operative facts which must 
exist for certain contracts of guaranty to be enforceable.8 Condi-
tions may be express, implied, or constructive. The guarantor 
creates an express condition when he uses definite language in the 
offer to limit his liability.9 An implied condition is based on a mu-
tual understanding of the parties that is not expressed in definite 
language.10 In contrast, a constructive condition is a circumstance 
which is treated as a condition on grounds of fairness and justice 
although the parties have manifested no intention whatever with 
regard to it.11 
The distinctions between the various types of conditions are 
clear; but in specific cases it is not always easy to classify the partic-
ular condition involved. Literal classification aside, in a sense all 
facts stated to be conditions by courts are constructive conditions 
unless the parties expressly and explicitly made them conditions. 
Considerations of fairness and reasonableness, the essence of con-
structive conditions, are given considerable weight in interpreting 
the words and actions of the parties.12 The subsequent analysis 
will treat notice as a constructive condition in this broader sense. 
B. Distinctions Between the Notice Requirements 
Notice of intention to accept is notice to the guarantor by the 
creditor that the latter intends to extend credit in reliance on the 
guaranty.13 Its purpose is to enable the guarantor to plan his affairs 
intelligently.14 Notice of transactions is notice to the guarantor by 
the creditor of the total balance due on the principal's account,15 
and, according to some authorities, notice of the terms of payment 
as well.16 Notice of transactions, like notice of intention to accept, 
aids the guarantor in the organization of his affairs.17 Notice of 
default is notice to the guarantor by the creditor that the principal 
8 See 3A CORBIN § 627. 
9 See id. § 631. 
10 See ibid. 
11 See id. § 632. 
12 See id. § 639, at 58. 
lS Lowe v. Beckwith, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 150 (1853). 
H See Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113, 125 (1833). 
111 Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 461 (1850). 
16 E.g., Craft v. Isham, 13 Conn. 28, 40 (1838). 
17 See 1 STORY, CONTRACTS 360 (1st ed. 1844). 
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has failed to perform the obligation guaranteed.18 The object of 
notice of default is to safeguard the guarantor's rights of recourse.10 
Notice of intention to accept, notice of transactions, and notice 
of default all constitute requirements which must be met in some, 
but not all, contracts of guaranty. They are imposed by the courts 
as constructive conditions of the guarantor's liability on certain 
contracts unless negatived by express terms.20 Notice of intention 
to accept, however, is the only type of notice that is necessarily con-
tractual in theory. It is considered either a condition precedent to 
formation of a contract21 or a condition precedent to the guaran-
tor's duty of performance.22 Although notice of transactions and 
notice of default are also referred to as constructive conditions of 
the guarantor's liability,23 failure to dispatch these notices actually 
operates as a suretyship defense, i.e., the guarantor is permitted 
to offset against his contractual liability the amount of pecuniary 
loss that he can link to the failure to receive notice.24 
In theory, the notice requirements are due at different times. 
Precise delineation may be more difficult as a practical matter. 
Notice of intention to accept is due within a reasonable time after 
commencement of performance by the creditor;25 notice of trans-
18 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833). The notice of default 
to which a guarantor of payment may be entitled should be distinguished from notice of 
inability to collect, which a creditor may be required to give a guarantor of collection. See 
text accompanying notes 240-41 infra. 
19 See Douglass v. Reynolds, supra note 18. If the principal has defaulted, the guarantor 
can sue to require him to pay the creditor. See SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP § 46 (1950) [hereinafter 
cited as S1MPSON]. Alternatively, the guarantor can pay the creditor and become subrogated 
to the latter's rights and remedies as well as his security. Upon fulfillment of the principal's 
obligation the guarantor also has a right to seek full reimbursement from the principal 
and contribution from co-guarantors if he has paid more than his proportionate share of 
the obligation guaranteed. See id. §§ 47-49. The guarantor assumes the risk of the insolvency 
of the principal and his co-guarantors during the interim between default and exercise 
of his rights of recourse. Notice of default limits the time during which the gparantor bears 
this risk because of ignorance. 
The notice of the creditor's inability to collect from the principal that may be due a 
guarantor of collection serves a distinct function. Since the creditor's failure to collect 
from the principal indicates that the guarantor's rights of recourse are already impaired, 
this notice requirement is principally designed to avoid unnecessary litigation, i.e., to 
, enable the guarantor of collection to meet his obligation on demand and thereby obviate 
legal proceedings by the creditor. See R.EsTATEMENT, SECURITY, Explanatory Notes § 134 
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1940). 
20 See Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 CoLUM, L. REv. 903 (1942). 
21 Davis v. Wells, 104 U.S. 159 (1881). 
22 Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass. 496, 500, 37 N.E. 665, 667-68 (1894) (dictum). 
23 See, e.g., 3A CORBIN § 726. 
24 Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (IO How.) 461, 474-75 (1850) (dictum). 
25 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833), as explained in 
Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 461, 474 (1850) (dictum). 
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actions, within a reasonable time after the close of transactions;26 
and notice of default, within a reasonable time after the principal's 
default.27 
II. NoTICE OF INTENTION To AccEPT 
A. The English Rule 
Lord Ellenborough inaugurated the concept of notice of in-
tention to accept in 1813 when he held that it was a constructive 
condition of the following offer: 
"Gentlemen, as I understand Messrs. David Anderson and Co., 
of Quebec, have given you an order for rigging, & etc., which 
will amount to about four thousand pounds, I can assure you, 
from what I know of D. A.'s honor and probity, you will be 
perfectly safe in crediting them to that amount; indeed I have 
no objection to guaranty you against any loss from giving them 
this credit.''28 
The subsequent elaboration of this concept bears a striking simi-
larity to the pattern of the American cases analyzed below.29 Notice 
is a constructive condition in English and Commonwealth law 
whenever the phrasing of the guaranty should indicate to the cred-
itor that the guarantor expects notice or needs it in order to make 
his plans. 
Notice will be required when the offer indicates a willingness 
to guaranty only if the creditor signifies his intention to accept. 
Notice was required, for instance, when the guaranty stated: "If 
you can arrange matters to your mutual satisfaction, I am sure that 
Mr. Hugill will prove a very reliable person to deal with. I will 
myself, with pleasure, become security for anything he may be dis-
posed to give an order for."30 Notice is also necessary when the offer 
is extended to two or more prospective creditors and the guarantor 
does not know which one will accept, 31 and when the offer indicates 
20 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833). Notice of transactions 
is due only once, regardless of whether a temporary or a continuing guaranty is involved. 
Ibid. The former usually secures a single transaction; the latter, multiple trans-
actions. See STEARNS, SuRETYSHIP § 4.7 (5th ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as STEARNS]. 
27 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., supra note 26. 
28 M'Iver v. Richardson, 1 M. &: S. 557, 105 Eng. Rep. 208 (1813). 
20 See text accompanying notes 98-180 infra. 
30 Kastner v. Winstanley, 20 U.C.C.P. 101, 101-02 (Can. 1869); accord Symmons v. 
Want, 2 Stark 371, 171 Eng. Rep. 676 (1818) (alternative holding). But see A. A. Davison 
Pty. Ltd. v. Seabrook, 37 Argus L.R. 156 (Viet. S.C. Austl. 1931). 
31 Lott v. Collins, 8 S.C.R. 104 (N.S."W.S.C. Austl. 1869). 
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that the guarantor is unsure that he is a suitable guarantor, e.g., 
when the offer names a reference who can vouch for the guarantor's 
credit standing.32 
Notice of intention to accept will not be demanded if the word-
ing of the offer or the circumstances of the making of the offer 
should indicate to the creditor that the guarantor does not expect 
or need it. Thus, notice is unnecessary when the guarantor uses 
positive words of guaranty even though he does not expressly waive 
notice, for example: "Please pay to my tenant Imam Din whatever 
money he requires and settle your account every harvest, because 
he would require money for agricultural and seed purposes. I am 
responsible for the amount borrowed by Imam Din."33 Circum-
stances which should lead the guarantor to anticipate acceptance 
are numerous. Illustrations include a request by the creditor to 
the guarantor for the guaranty,34 and knowledge by the guarantor 
that he is an acceptable guarantor and that his offer was taken by 
the principal to a meeting at which it was expected that credit 
would be extended.35 A request by the principal for the guaranty, 
however, does not affect the guarantor's expectations of acceptance 
unless he knows that the proposal originated with the creditor.36 
Notice of intention to accept can be waived by failure to object 
when the creditor tardily informs the guarantor that he intends to 
hold him liable.37 The guarantor's seasonable knowledge of accept-
ance, although acquired from a source other than the creditor, is 
the equivalent of notice of intention to accept.88 
B. The Division of the American Authorities 
The apparent conflict in the cases involves unilateral contracts 
of guaranty, since it is accepted that the creditor's promise must be 
communicated to the guarantor to form a bilateral contract of 
guaranty.39 Treatise writers have attempted to mitigate the con-
fusion concerning notice of intention to accept by isolating distinct 
32 Mozley v. Tinkler, 1 C.M. &: R. 692, 695-96, 149 Eng. Rep. 1258, 1260 (1835) (opinion 
of Parke, B.). 
83 Ranga Ram-Thakar Das v. Raghbir Singh, 1928 Lah. 938, 113 Indian Cas. 780 (India 
1928); accord, Manning v. Mills, 12 U.C.Q.B. 515 (Can. 1855). 
34 Oldershaw v. King, 2 H. &: N. 399,403, 157 Eng. Rep. 165, 167, rev'd on other grounds, 
2 H. &: N. 517, 157 Eng. Rep. 213 (1857) (comment by Bromwell, B.); Fraser v. Douglas, 
16 Man. Rep. 484, 487-88, 5 W.L.R. 52, 54-55 (Can. 1906) (dictum); see Jenkins v. Ruttan, 
8 U.C.Q.B. 625 (Can. 1852). 
85 See Luck v. Ilka, 1951 Q.S.R. 281 (Aust!. 1951). 
36 Mozley v. Tinkler, 1 C.M. &: R. 692, 149 Eng. Rep. 1258 (1835). 
87 Sorby v. Gordon, 30 L.T.R. (n.s.) 528 (Ex. 1874-). 
38 Jays Ltd. v. Sala, 14 T.L.R. 461 (Q.B. 1898). 
39 See 1 WILLISTON § 69A, at 219. 
1963] GUARANTY CONTRACTS 63 
bodies. of authority which support different legal principles or 
"rules." It has been suggested that there is (I) a "federal rule" 
requiring notice of intention to accept to form a unilateral contract 
of guaranty; (2) a "Massachusetts rule" treating notice as a con-
dition precedent to the guarantor's duty to perform; (3) an "Eng-
lish rule" dispensing with notice of intention to accept altogether; 
and (4) a "majority rule" exacting notice only when the language of 
the offer or the surrounding circumstances should have led the 
creditor to believe that the guarantor expected it.40 
The labels given certain of these purported rules are mislead-
ing. The "federal rule," for instance, developed in the federal 
courts when they applied general principles of law in diversity 
cases.41 Today, of course, state substantive law governs.42 Since the 
use of this rule in federal diversity cases now depends on its adop-
tion as state substantive law, it is deceptive to denominate it the 
"federal rule." The "Massachusetts rule" presents similar prob-
lems; it is no longer followed in Massachusetts.43 The "English 
rule" bears an even more unfortunate name. It does not promote 
clarity to refer to a rule which repudiates the concept of notice of 
intention to accept as the "English rule" when the concept of such 
notice originated in English law.44 Because of the inaccuracies of 
these designations, the "federal rule" will be referred to as the 
condition precedent theory and the "Massachusetts rule" as the 
condition subsequent theory. The "English rule" will not be 
alluded to at all. 
The rules discerned by the treatise writers deal with two dis-
tinct issues: (1) when notice of intention to accept is necessary, 
and, (2) if notice is necessary, the effect of failure to send it. The 
rules pertaining to each question must be considered separately 
for the true state of the authorities to be understood. 
1. When Notice Is Necessary 
Simpson correctly indicated that the majority of American 
jurisdictions will consider both the terms of the offer and the 
40 See .ARANT, SURETYSHIP § 26 (1931) [hereinafter cited as ARANT]; SU,IPSON § 25. 
,vmiston was content to note that some cases required notice and others did not. See 
1 WILLISTON § 69A, at 219-21. This statement appears in all three editions of Williston. 
Whenever this is the case reference will be made to Williston and citation will be to the 
third edition (1957). 
41 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
42 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
43 See Campbell 550-51. 
44 See note 30 supra. 
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surrounding circumstances in determining whether notice of in-
tention to accept is necessary.45 If either should suggest to the 
creditor that the guarantor is uncertain whether his offer will be 
accepted, most jurisdictions make notice of intention to accept a 
constructive condition of the guarantor's liability.46 However, no 
treatise writer has identified the minority rule as to when notice 
is necessary. Simpson did not attempt to do so.47 Arant erroneously 
stated that some American jurisdictions never made notice a con-
structive condition. 48 His cases merely indicated that neither the 
majority nor the true minority rule made notice a constructive 
condition of all unilateral contracts of guaranty.40 
The true minority rule has been adopted at common law by 
Minnesota,50 Nebraska,51 New York,52 Ohio,53 and Tennesee.64 This 
rule limits the courts to the terms of the offer in determining 
whether notice is requisite. If the wording should intimate to the 
creditor that the guarantor is uncertain whether his offer will be 
accepted, notice will be required. Otherwise, it is unnecessary. 
Other circumstances are not taken into account.55 
Virtually every American jurisdiction, including those with 
statutes on the subject,56 adheres to either the majority or minority 
rule outlined above. The theoretical disagreement indicated by 
these two rules, however, has seldom led to varying results in prac-
tice. There are significant facts in almost every decision requiring 
or dispensing with notice which satisfactorily explain the result, 
regardless of the theory enunciated by the court. This reduces the 
actual area of disagreement between the majority and the minority 
rule to a few minority rule cases which allow positive and unquali-
fied words of guaranty to relieve the creditor of the duty to send 
45 SIMPSON § 25. 
46 E.g., Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Richards, 115 U.S. 524 (1885); Atlanta Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Tyler, 104 Ga. App. 707, 122 S.E.2d 591 (1961); Black, Starr, & Frost v. Grabow, 
216 Mass. 516, 104 N.E. 346 (1914). 
47 SIMPSON § 25. 
48 ARANT § 26, at 64. 
40 Id. at 67 n.l. 
50 Midland Nat'l Bank v. Security Elevator Co., 161 Minn. 30, 200 N.W. 851 (1924); 
see R.EsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, MINN. ANNOT. § 56 (1934). 
51 Wilcox v. Draper, 12 Neb. 138, 10 N.W. 579 (1881); see REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, 
NEB. ANNOT. § 56 (1933). 
52 Union Bank v. Coster's Ex'rs, 3 N.Y. 203 (1850); see REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, N.Y. 
ANNOT. § 56 (1933). 
53 Powers & Weightman v. Bumcratz, 12 Ohio St. 273 (1861); see REsrATEMENT, CoN• 
TRACTS, Omo ANNOT. § 56 (1933). 
54 Bright v. McKni~ht, 33 Tenn. 158 (18~3). 
55 E.g., Smith & Cnttenden v. Dann, 6 Hill 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844). 
56 See text accompanying notes 181-87 infra. 
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notice, although there are no other significant facts which justify 
this result.57 Factual analysis of the American decisions will be 
undertaken below. The "rules" concerning the effect of failure to 
give notice will first be examined for other areas of disagreement. 
2. Effect of Failure To Give Notice 
There are two theories on the effect of failure to give notice 
in situations where notice is required: the condition precedent 
theory and the condition subsequent theory. The former holds 
that when notice is necessary58 it is a condition precedent to forma-
tion of a contract.59 If it is not given when essential, no contract 
exists between the guarantor and the creditor although the creditor 
has performed the requested act. The condition subsequent theory 
originated with the Massachusetts case of Bishop v. Eaton60 and 
has proved extremely attractive to academic writers.61 Under this 
theory, performance of the requested act by the creditor effects a 
unilateral contract of guaranty, but the guarantor is under no 
obligation to perform his promise unless he receives seasonable 
notice of acceptance. Notice is needed to prevent the occurrence 
of a condition subsequent which terminates the contract created by 
the creditor's performance of the requested act. 
Since an offer can be revoked before acceptance, the guarantor 
would appear to possess the power of revocation for a longer time 
under the condition precedent theory. It requires both perform-
ance of the requested act and notice of intention to accept for an 
effective acceptance. Performance of the requested act alone is 
67 A guaranty in the form of a bond in penal sum is a historical example. These 
bonds were phrased so as to create a present indebtedness of definite amount subject 
to a condition subsequent. See Klosterman v. Olcott, 25 Neb. 382, 41 N.W. 250, rev'd on 
other grounds, 27 Neb. 685, 43 N.W. 422 (1899); Rochford v. Rothschild, 16 Ohio C.C.R. 
287, 9 Ohio C.C. Dec. 47 (1896); accord, Snyder v. Hufdley-Pierce-Anderson Co., 23 Ohio 
C.C.R. (n.s.) 599, 34 Ohio C.C. Dec. 424 (1912), afj'd, 91 Ohio St. 375, II0 N.E. 1068 (1914) 
(mem.). When no other significant facts warrant dispensing with notice the majority rule 
does not allow positive and unqualified words of guaranty to have that effect. See, e.g., 
Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Church, II N.D. 420, 92 N.W. 805 (1902). 
68 The majority rule determines whether notice is necessary by examining both the terms 
of the offer and the surrounding circumstances. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra. 
The minority rule considers only the terms of the offer. See text accompanying notes 
50-55 supra. 
ISO Majority rule: see ARANT § 26; SIMPSON § 25; STEARNS § 4.16. Minority rule: :Beekman 
v. Hale,_17 Johns. Cas. 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); Stafford v. Lowe, 16 Johns. Cas. 67 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1819); Irving Trust Co. v Tourkoff, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 663 (Ohio App. 1933); 
?,!'Iver v. Richardson, l M. &: S. 557, 105 Eng. Rep. 208 (1813). 
60 161 Mass. 496, 500, 37 N.E. 665, 667-68 (1894) (dictum). 
61 See, e.g., l CORBIN § 68; 1 WILLISTON § 69AA; Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of 
Contract: Offer and Acceptance I, 48 YALE L.J. 1, 15 n.30 (1938). 
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sufficient according to the condition subsequent theory. Williston 
championed the latter theory for this reason. He stressed the in-
justice in permitting the guarantor to revoke his offer after per-
formance by the creditor merely because notice of intention to 
accept had not been dispatched. 62 
Jurisdictions following the condition precedent theory are not, 
however, as Draconian as the logical consequences of their theory 
suggest. While their courts refer to notice as essential to the 
formation of a contract, they also undoubtedly consider that com-
mencement of performance by the creditor renders the offer irre-
vocable for a reasonable time. 63 The condition precedent and 
condition subsequent theories are thus indistinguishable apart 
from verbal formulation: 
"When notice of acceptance is necessary it makes little practi-
cal difference whether the doing of the acts called for is said 
to complete a contract giving rise to a duty subject to notice 
as a condition precedent, or is conceived of as merely depriving 
the offeror of his normal power of revocation. Under either 
analysis the offeror cannot prevent imposition of a duty to pay 
and it is clear that the offeree cannot recover unless notice is 
given."64 
Nonetheless, strong objection has been taken to the theoretical 
implications of the condition precedent theory. It has been criti-
cized as confusing unilateral contracts with bilateral contracts,65 
and as inconsistent with other propositions concerning notice of 
intention to accept.66 These propositions include: (1) notice of in-
tention to accept can be waived in the offer or by the guarantor's 
subsequent conduct; (2) knowledge of acceptance by the guarantor 
dispenses with notice of intention to accept; (3) in the case of a 
continuing guaranty, notice may be given within a reasonable 
time after the close of all transactions; (4) the guarantor is not 
discharged by lack of notice when he is not injured by its absence; 
(5) notice of intention to accept is not a counter-promise and does 
not bind the creditor; and (6) the guarantor can revoke his promise 
62 Kincheloe v. Holmes, Sturgeon & Co., 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 5 (1846); 1 WILLISTON § 69, 
at 218. Protection of the offeree's reliance on an offer is a basic policy of contract law. See 
1 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932); Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936). 
63 Oaks v. Weller, 13 Vt. 106, IIO•ll (1841) (dictum); see REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, KY. 
ANN0T. 34 (1938); Rogers, Notice of Acceptance in Contracts of Guaranty, 5 CoLUM, L. 
REV. 215, 219 (1905). 
64 ARANT § 26, at 69. 
65 See I WILusroN § 69A, at 221. 
66 See Campbell 535. 
1963] GUARANTY CONTRACTS 67 
between notification and act. It is submitted, however, that these 
propositions are all reconcilable with the view that notice of in-
tention to accept is integral to certain unilateral contracts of 
guaranty. 
Notice of intention to accept can be waived in the offer of 
guaranty.07 Williston suggested that this indicated that the credi-
tor's performance completed the contract, and notice, if necessary 
at all, was only a condition precedent to enforcement of the contract 
against the guarantor. The parties, he pointed out, could not waive 
an element required by law for formation of a contract.68 This 
argument is based on a misunderstanding of the notice require-
ment. The requirement is not a mandatory rule of law applicable 
to all guaranties. Notice of intention to accept is a constructive 
condition of some unilateral contracts of guaranty when the parties 
have not provided otherwise. Notice is requisite when the terms 
of the offer or the surrounding circumstances indicate that the 
guarantor reasonably expects or needs it. If the offer expressly 
waives notice it is clearly consonant with the rationale of the 
notice requirement to respect this manifestation of intent.69 
Sending of notice of intention to accept can also be waived by 
the subsequent conduct of the guarantor, e.g., by a subsequent 
promise to pay. 70 Williston considered this inconsistent with the 
idea that notice is a condition precedent to creation of a con-
tract. He maintained that a "gratuitous promise" could not form a 
contract that had previously failed to come into being.71 Williston's 
argument is apparently based on the doctrine of consideration. The 
subsequent promise by the guarantor is typically made after credit 
is extended in reliance on the offer of guaranty and after the time 
for giving notice of intention to accept has elapsed. No contract 
exists, since the condition precedent theory makes timely notice 
a prerequisite to formation of a contract. In this situation, Willis-
ton inferentially dismisses the reliance of the creditor on the 
previous offer of guaranty as consideration for the subsequent 
promise. He invokes the proposition that past events are insufficient 
67 E.g., Bowdan v. Gooderham & Worts, Ltd., 272 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam) 
(alternative holding). 
08 l WILUSfON § 69AA, at 223-24. 
oo In Hughes v. Roberts, Johnson & Rand Shoe Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2003, 72 S.W. 799 
(1903) the court noted that, the defendant being sui juris, there was no legal reason why 
he could not waive notice of acceptance. 
70 Farwell & Co. v. Sully, 38 Iowa 387 (1874). 
71 l WILLISTON § 69AA, at 223-24. 
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consideration for present promises.72 This rule, however, is subject 
to exceptions. One exception furnishes analogous support for the 
view that the creditor's reliance on the previous offer of guaranty 
constitutes consideration for the subsequent promise to pay: 
"In the early history of the common law action of assump-
sit, there were a good many cases in which this action was sus-
tained upon an express promise to pay for a past service that 
had been rendered by the plaintiff at the defendant's request. 
There is some, but not very much, modern authority to the 
same effect."78 
Williston's criticism can also be met on other grounds. The 
subsequent conduct of the guarantor which constitutes a waiver 
of notice of intention to accept includes an acknowledgment of 
liability74 as well as a subsequent promise. This suggests that the 
guarantor's conduct perfects the original arrangement between 
the parties and does not form a new contract. The subsequent 
behavior of the guarantor can be interpreted as a waiver of the 
defect in acceptance resulting from the creditor's failure to dis-
patch timely notice of intention to accept. 
Williston objected to contract formation through the offeror's 
waiver of a flaw in acceptance.75 He believed that it was unfair to 
permit the offeror to waive a defective acceptance since it allowed 
him to speculate at the expense of the offeree. If market conditions 
changed in his favor, he could assert the defect in acceptance and 
make a more advantageous contract elsewhere. If market condi-
tions changed so that the offeree had made a bad bargain, the 
offeror could waive the defect in acceptance and hold him to it. 
However, this line of argument is not relevant to the unilateral con-
tract of guaranty situation. There is no question of binding the 
creditor-offeree. He is not asked for a promise. The courts are con-
cerned with protecting the creditor's reliance on the offer of 
guaranty. The creditor has typically extended credit to the princi-
pal in the belief that he is secured by a guaranty, but he has lost this 
security because he failed to give due notice of intention to accept. 
When the guarantor indicates by his subsequent conduct that he 
does not claim the release from liability afforded him by the notice 
72 See I WILLISTON § 142, at 620-21. 
73 l CORBIN § 233, at 764. 
74 See City Nat'l Bank v. Phelps, 86 N.Y. 484 (1881). 
75 1 WILLISTON § 82, at 336. 
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requirement, it is reasonable to hold that he has waived the omis-
sion in the creditor's acceptance.76 
Seasonable knowledge of acceptance is equivalent to receipt _of 
notice of intention to accept.77 Professor Campbell questioned 
whether this was consistent with the condition precedent theory.78 
The answer is in the affirmative when the offer does not specify a 
particular mode of acceptance. 79 
Williston maintained that the condition precedent theory was 
based on an inept analogy to the principles governing acceptance of 
offers for bilateral contracts.80 The analogy was noticeably strained, 
he pointed out, since notice of acceptance of a continuing 
guaranty may be given within a reasonable time after the close of 
transactions. The proper time for communication of acceptance of 
an offer for a bilateral contract is at the outset of transactions, not 
at their close.81 This criticism is directed at a straw man. Acceptance 
analogous to that of offers for bilateral contracts is not attempted 
or required. Notice of intention to accept is not a promise. Belated 
notice, however, would not give the guarantor the opportunity to 
protect himself which is the true foundation of the notice require-
ment. Thus, it is notice of transactions under a continuing guar-
anty which must be given within a reasonable time after the close 
of transactions.82 Notice of intention to accept must be given 
earlier.83 
Williston stated that lack of notice of acceptance discharged the 
guarantor only when he suffered consequent loss.84 He then made 
the point that if notice were a condition precedent to formation of 
a contract the fact of injury would be immaterial.85 The point is 
well taken, but Williston misreads the cases. If notice of intention 
to accept is necessary, failure to receive it does unconditionally 
76 See 3A CORBIN § 759, at 513. 
77 Rich v. Clayton Mark & Co., 250 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1957). 
78 Campbell 535. 
70 See I CORBIN § 67, at 210. 
80 1 WILLisrON § 69A, at 221. 
81 Id. § 69AA, at 224. 
82 The cases cited by "Williston make this point with regard to notice of transactions, 
not notice of intention to accept. See 1 WILLrsroN § 69AA, at 224 n.20. 
83 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne & Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833) held that notice of 
intention to accept must be given within a reasonable time after acceptance. This was clar-
ified by the statement of Mr. Justice Nelson in Louisville Mfg .. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (IO 
How.) 461, 475 (1850) (dictum), that notice of intention to accept should be dispatched 
prior to notice of transactions at a time when the defendant's liabilities are still accruing. 
84 I WrLLisroN § 69A, at 222. 
85 Ibid. 
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discharge the guarantor. 86 Actual loss only limits the consequences 
of failure to dispatch notice of transactions or notice of default.87 
Notice of intention to accept is not a promise.88 Campbell sug-
gested it was therefore inconsistent to treat it as a condition prece-
dent to formation of a contract.89 This, however, is a non sequitur. 
The guarantor can make notice a condition of acceptance by 
express stipulation, and the courts can achieve the same result 
through the device of constructive condition. 00 
The guarantor may revoke his offer after receipt of notice of 
intention to accept as long as performance of the requested act has 
not begun.91 Campbell thought this was also inharmonious with the 
concept of notice as a condition precedent to contract formation.02 
There is no incompatibility if it is borne in mind that notice is 
required, not a promise. Notice is a condition of acceptance, but it 
is the requested performance that is the consideration for the 
guarantor's promise. His offer remains revocable if notice alone is 
given. On the other hand, if the requested performance occurs 
without notice, the offer is supported by consideration and be-
comes irrevocable for a reasonable time.93 
The preceding analysis suggests that there is nothing unortho-
dox in treating notice of intention to accept as a condition prece-
dent to the formation of certain unilateral contracts of guaranty. 
The American Law Institute, however, has rejected this approach 
because of its alleged deficiencies and has approved the condition 
subsequent theory.94 The virtual identity of the condition prece-
dent and condition subsequent theories makes the ALI position 
of little substantive importance except as a source of confusion. 
Because the ALI action can be construed as treating the verbal 
difference between the two rules as a real difference, several of the 
annotations to the Restatement of Contracts indicated that the 
jurisdiction surveyed adopted the condition precedent theory 
86 E.g., Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Richards, 115 U.S. 524 (1885). 
87 Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 461, 474-75 (1850) (dictum). l 
WILLISTON § 69A, at 222 n.14 actually cites notice of transactions and notice of default 
cases. 
88 See Campbell 535. 
89 Ibid. 
90 The English, for instance, do not question this. See SALMOND &: 'WILLIAMS, CONTRACTS 
83 (2d ed. Hl45). 
91 See Campbell 535. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Oaks v. Weller, 13 Vt. 106, 110-11 (1841) (dictum). 
94 1 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 56 (1932); REsTATEMENT, SECURITY § 86 (1941). 
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and did not follow the restatement.95 The Montana annotation, for 
instance, suggested that the apparent espousal by the Montana 
code of the condition precedent theory rejected the restatement 
approach.00 The Oklahoma annotation, on the other hand, inter-
preted an identical statute as probably in accord with the restate-
ment.07 The fog caused by the ALI position is unfortunate. There 
are two theories concerning the effect of failure to give notice, but 
they both lead to the same result. 
C. Factual Comparison of the American Authorities 
The only substantial conflict of authority with regard to notice 
of intention to accept relates to the method of determining whether 
notice is necessary. Courts following the majority rule consider 
both the terms of the offer and the circumstances surrounding the 
offer in making this judgment. Courts adopting the minority rule 
regard only the face of the offer. The following is an analysis of 
what is believed to be the majority of American decisions on this 
question. Significant facts in these decisions are emphasized. It is 
submitted that these facts justify the result reached by the court as 
to the exigency of notice in the particular case. If this is true, the 
theoretical distinction between the majority and minority rule is 
relatively unimportant in practice. The greater number of the 
cases analyzed are reconcilable by means of the factual approach. 
I. When Notice Is Necessary 
Notice is required by either rule whenever the language in the 
offer should indicate to the creditor that the guarantor is uncertain 
whether his offer will be accepted. An offer "to whom it may con-
cern," for instance, shows on its face that the guarantor has no 
reasonable expectation that it will be accepted by a particular 
creditor or by anyone at all.08 Other examples include the follow-
ing language: 
Oil See, e.g., REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, ALA. ANNOT. § 56 (1937); REsrATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS, CONN. ANNOT. § 56 (1933); REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, loWA ANNOT. § 56 (1934); 
REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, Mo. ANNOT. 23 (1933); REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, S.D. ANNOT. 
§ 56 (1937), 
06 REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, MONT. ANNOT. § 56 (1940). 
07 REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, OKLA. ANNOT. § 56 (1939). 
98 See Lawson v. Townes, Oliver &: Co., 2 Ala. 373 (1841); Gano v. Farmers' Bank, 103 
Ky. 508, 45 S.W. 519 (1898); Mussey v. Rayner, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 223 (1839); Hill &: 
Henderson v. Calvin &: Hurst, 5 Miss. (4 How.) 231 (1834); Columbia Baking &: Mfg. Co. v. 
Schissler, 35 Pa. Super. 621 (1908). 
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"I will, if you please, stand responsible for the payment of it, 
at the time you and James may agree on."99 
"I would be willing to guarantee payment of Mr. Tourkoff's 
drafts providing you would grant him ninety day terms, as it 
was my understanding he requested this of you previously."100 
On the other hand, only the majority rule considers the cir-
cumstances surrounding the offer in assessing the utility of notice. 
The following are typical resolutions of the question. 
Unsolicited Offer. When the offer is unsolicited by the credi-
tor, the guarantor, absent other circumstances, has no indication 
that it will be accepted.101 A classic example of an unsolicited guar-
anty is provided by the case of Tuckerman v. French,1°2 in which 
the offer of guaranty was made on the initiative of the guarantor 
without the knowledge of the principal. An offer of guaranty con-
tained in a letter introducing the principal is more typical.103 But 
notice is usually found necessary whenever an unsolicited offer is 
involved.104 
Solicitation of the guaranty by the principal does not affect the 
necessity of notice.105 The principal's request gives the guarantor 
little indication whether his offer is acceptable to the creditor. Nor 
does the fact that the principal requests the guarantor to execute 
one of the creditor's forms dispense with notice when the creditor 
did not authorize him to do so.106 If the guarantor knows that the 
creditor asked the principal to obtain his guaranty, however, the 
guarantor should reasonably anticipate acceptance, and notice is 
unnecessary .107 
Principal Transaction Incomplete. It is not uncommon for an 
99 See Beekman v. Hale, 17 Johns. Cas. 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819). 
100 See Irving Trust Co. v. Tourkoff, 13 Ohio Law Abs. 663 (Ohio App. 1933); accord, 
Meyer v. Ruhstadt, 66 Ill. App. 346, 347 (1896); Central Sav. Bank v. Shine, 48 Mo. 456 
(1871). 
101 New Haven County Bank v. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 206, 217 (1842) (dictum). 
102 7 Me. 115 (1830). 
103 See McCollum v. Cushing, 22 Ark. 540 (1861); Rapelye 8: Purdy v. Bailey, 3 Conn. 
438 (1820); Lowe & Co. v. Beckwith, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 150 (1853); Wardlaw, Walker 8: 
Burnsides v. Harrison, 40 S.C.L. (11 Rich.) 626 (1858); Russell v. Clarke's Ex'rs, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 69, 93-94 (1812) (dictum). 
104 See Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833); Smith v. Anthony, 
5 Mo. 504 (1838); Taylor v. Wetmore, 10 Ohio 490 (1841); Rothchild Bros. v. Lomax, 75 
Ore. 395, 146 Pac. 479 (1915); Kellogg v. Stockton & Fuller, 29 Pa. 460 (1857); Edmondston 
v. Drake, 30 U.S. (5 Pct.) 624, 636-37 (1831) (dictum). 
105 See Lee v. Dick, 35 U.S. (10 Pct.) 482 (1836); Winnebago Paper Mills v. Travis, 56 
Minn. 480, 58 N.W. 36 (1894). 
106 Sec Ladd &: Bush v. Hayes, 105 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1939); Standard Sewing Mach. 
Co. v. Church, 11 N.D. 420, 92 N.W. 805 (1902). 
101 See text accompanying notes 124-26 infra. 
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offer of guaranty to be made before the transaction between the 
creditor and the principal has been agreed upon. Indeed, if the 
consideration for the guaranty is the creditor's promise to the 
principal, the guaranty must be given before this promise is made. 
Otherwise the creditor's promise will be a past event and insuffi-
cient consideration for the guaranty.108 The guarantor cannot be 
sure that his offer will be accepted if he knows that a contemplated 
contract between the creditor and the principal has not been ex-
ecuted. Notice is requisite unless other circumstances should lead 
the guarantor to anticipate or to learn of acceptance.109 Asmussen 
v. Post Printing & Publishing Co.,110 for instance, held notice neces-
sary to obligate guarantors who had signed a guaranty on an 
application for a newspaper agency submitted by the principal to 
the creditor. There are a number of cases in accord with Asmussen, 
especially if an application or order sent by the principal provides 
that it is binding when accepted at the creditor's place of business. m 
This provision should put the creditor on notice that the guarantor 
is not likely to obtain prompt knowledge of acceptance. 
Receipt of consideration from the creditor should also lead 
the guarantor to anticipate acceptance.112 Thus, McConnon & Co. 
v. Laursen113 held that an acknowledgment of receipt of consider-
ation in the guaranty precluded the guarantor from introducing 
evidence that the contract between the creditor and principal had 
not been agreed upon when the offer of guaranty was made.114 
Intimation of Rejection. An intimation to the guarantor by 
the creditor or his agent that the guaranty may not be acceptable 
108 Tomihiro v. United Hotel Corp., 145 Ore. 629, 28 P.2d 880 (1934). 
100 See Asmussen v. Post Printing &: Publishing Co., 26 Colo. App. 416, 143 Pac. 396 
(1914); Linro Medicine Co. v. Moon, 190 Mo. App. 366, 177 S.W. 322 (1915); Coe &: 
Richmond v. Buchler, 110 Pa. 366, 5 Atl. 20 (1885) (per curiam); William Deering &: Co. 
v. Mortell, 21 S.D. 159, 110 N.W. 86 (1906). 
110 26 Colo. App. 416, 143 Pac. 396 (1914). See also Snyder v. Click, 112 Ind. 293, 13 
N.E. 581 (1887); United States Fid. &: Guar. Co. v. Riefler, 239 U.S. 17 (1915) (contract of 
indemnity). 
111 See Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Richards, 115 U.S. 524 (1885); Barnes Cycle Co. v. 
Reed, 84 Fed. 603 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898), rev'd on other grounds, 91 Fed. 481 (3d Cir. 1899); 
Greer Mach. Co. v. Sears, 119 Ky. 697, 66 S.W. 521 (1902); American Agricultural Chem. Co. 
v. Ellsworth, 109 Me. 195, 83 Atl. 546 (1912); Texas Co. v. Stanberry, 165 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 
App. 1942) (per curiam); John Deere Plow Co. v. McCullough, 102 Mo. App. 458, 76 s:w. 
716 (1903); Deering Harvester Co. v. Sulser, 78 Mo. App. 670 (1899); T. & H. Smith &: Co. 
v. Thesmann, 20 Okla. 133, 93 Pac. 977 (1908). 
112 See text accompanying note 146 infra. 
113 22 N.D. 604, 135 N.W. 213 (1912). 
114 Sec text accompanying notes 147-54 infra for further discussion of acknowledgment 
of receipt of consideration. 
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is enough to require notice of intention to accept.115 But an inti-
mation to the principal which is not communicated to the guar-
antor does not have this effect.116 The intimation of rejection must 
decrease the guarantor's expectations of acceptance, but it cannot 
constitute a categorical objection to his offer.117 If it does, the 
creditor's power of acceptance will be terminated,118 and the ques-
tion of notice of intention to accept will not arise. In J.E. Taylor 
& Co. v. Empire Lighting Fixture Co.,119 for instance, the creditor 
requested the guarantor to indorse a promissory note executed by 
the principal after receipt of the offer of guaranty. The guarantor 
declined. It was held that the creditor could not thereafter hold 
the guarantor on the guaranty without notice of intention to accept. 
On the other hand, American Woolen Co. v. Moskowitz120 did not 
require notice. The creditor's overture for a more formal guaranty 
was not considered to destroy the guarantor's expectations of accept-
ance when the original guaranty was retained and credit later 
extended in reliance on it. It is significant that the formal guaranty 
sought did not alter the material terms of the original offer. 
Geographical Separation. When the guarantor lives a consid-
erable distance from the creditor and the principal, notice of 
intention to accept is requisite provided no other significant facts 
are present.121 Conversely, if the creditor knows that the guarantor 
and the principal are in close proximity, notice is not necessary.122 
2. When Notice Is Not Necessary 
Guarantor's Anticipation of Acceptance. Circumstances which 
should raise a reasonable expectation of acceptance in the mind of 
115 See, e.g., M. E. Smith &: Co. v. Kimble, 31 S.D. 18, 139 N.W. 348 (1913) (alternative 
holding). 
116 Caton v. Shaw & Tiffany, 2 Har. & Gill 13 (Md. 1827). 
117 See 1 CORBIN § 84. 
118 See 1 R.EsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 35, 38 (1932). The courts are unlikely to reach 
this conclusion if the creditor subsequently relies on the original offer of guaranty and the 
guarantor does not change his position in reliance on the intimation of rejection. See cases 
cited note 120 infra. 
110 273 Fed. 739 (D.C. Cir. 1921). 
120 159 App. Div. 382, 144 N.Y. Supp. 532 (1913); accord, Bryant v. Food Mach. &: Chem. 
Corp., 130 So. 2d 132 (Fla. App. 1961) (per curiam); Marx & Blum v. Luling Co-op Ass'n, 
17 Tex. Civ. App. 408, 43 S.W. 596 (1897). 
121 See Black, Starr & Frost v. Grabow, 216 Mass. 516, 104 N.E. 346 (1914); Bishop v. 
Eaton, 161 Mass. 496, 37 N.E. 665 (1894); Oaks v. Weller, 13 Vt. 106 (1941); Miami County 
Nat'I Bank v. Goldberg, 133 Wis. 175, 113 N.W. 391 (1907). 
122 Lascelles v. Clark, 204 Mass. 362, 90 N.E. 875 (1910); see Standard Oil Co. v. Hoese, 
57 Neb. 665, 78 N.W. 292 (1899) (minority rule) (guaranty indicated that both guarantor 
and principal were located in Hartington, Nebraska). 
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the guarantor enable him to plan for the future. The raison d'etre 
for making notice a constructive condition thus disappears. 
Notice is patently non-functional when the guarantor knows 
that his personal guaranty is both acceptable and in proper form. 
This situation occurred in Schuman v. Arsht,123 where the guaran-
tor offered to furnish security and the creditor thereupon prepared 
a guaranty which he executed. Direct solicitation of the guaranty 
by the creditor has the same effect in most jurisdictions as long as 
the guaranty is responsive to the request.124 So does a request to the 
principal by the creditor for a particular person's guaranty when 
the desired individual furnishes a guaranty with knowledge of the 
request.125 
Newman v. Streator Coal Co.126 underscores the key element 
in the cases involving a request to the principal for a particular 
guaranty. Notice was required in Newman although the creditor 
specified an acceptable guarantor and furnished an appropriate 
form. This was because the principal did not inform the guarantor 
that the creditor had requested his personal guaranty, and the 
guarantor was consequently uncertain whether his offer would be 
accepted. The principal's knowledge that the offer would be ac-
cepted did not affect the result. The guarantor's reasonable expecta-
tions, not the principal's, are material. 
When the creditor requests the principal to obtain a guaranty 
but does not specify an acceptable guarantor, a different situation 
is presented. Although the guarantor may know that a guaranty is 
required, he does not know that his is acceptable.127 A number of 
123 249 Ill. App. 562 (1928); accord, State Nat'l Bank v. Wernicke, 185 Mich. 281, 151 
N.W. 1033 {1915). 
124 Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 163 La. 933, 113 So. 152 (1927); Standard 
Plumbing Supply Co. v. Laconte, 277 Mass. 497, 178 N.E. 611 (1931); Drucker v. Heyl-Dia, 
52 Misc. 142, 101 N.Y. Supp. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1906) (minority rule); Hunsley Paint Mfg. Co. 
v. Gray, 165 S.W.2d 486 {Tex. Civ. App. 1942); see Weil v. Free State Oil Co., 200 Md. 62, 
71, 87 A.2d 826, 830 (1952) (dictum). Contra, T. G. Evans & Co. v. McCormick, 167 Pa. 247, 
31 At!. 563 (1895) (per curiam). 
125 Frost v. Standard Metal Co., 215 Ill. 240, 74 N.E. 139 (1905); N. O. Nelson Mfg. Co. 
v. Shreve, 94 Mo. App. 518, 68 S.W. 376 (1902); Royal Tailors v. Newton, 66 Utah 154, 
239 Pac. 949 (1925); Bowdan v. Gooderham & Worts, Ltd., 272 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1959) 
(per curiam) (alternative holding); Oklahoma City Nat'! Bank v. Ezzard, 58 Okla. 251, 
159 Pac. 267 (1916) (alternative holding), afj'd per curiam on other grounds, 243 U.S. 631 
(1917); see Manry v. Waxelbaum Co., 108 Ga. 14, 33 S.E. 701 (1899); Jackson v. Yandes, 7 
Ind. 526 (1845); Great W. Mfg. Co. v. Porter, 103 Kan. 84, 172 Pac. 1018 (1918); Caton v. 
Shaw&: Tiffany, 2 Har. & Gill 13 (Md. 1827); Lenox v. Murphy, 171 Mass. 370, 50 N.E. 
644 (1898). 
120 19 Ill. App. 594 (1886); see Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Knight, 86 Ore. 165, 167 Pac. 
484 (1917); cf. Taylor v. Shouse, 73 Mo. 361 (1881). 
127 Detroit Free Press v. Pattengill, 155 Mich. 272, 118 N.W. 927 (1908); DeCremer 
v. Anderson, 113 Mich. 578, 71 N.W. 1090 (1897); Tolman Co. v. Means, 52 Mo. App. 385, 
388-89 (1893) (dictum). 
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cases hold notice of intention to accept essential for this reason.128 
Another group of cases dispenses with notice when the guarantor 
executes the creditor's form with knowledge that the creditor 
requested the principal to obtain a guaranty.120 Since the guarantor 
knows his financial condition and knows that the creditor will ex-
tend credit when a satisfactory guaranty is given, these cases appar-
ently reason that the guarantor should be able to estimate whether 
his guaranty will suffice. 
Other facts may dispense with notice when the creditor requests 
the principal to obtain a guaranty but does not designate a guaran-
tor. In Niles Tool-Works Co. v. Reynolds,130 for instance, the offer 
of guaranty was made on a purchase order for a single machine at 
a definite price. Most jurisdictions dispense with notice when a 
sum certain is guaranteed.131 Since the guarantor knows the extent 
of his potential liability, it is not considered unreasonable to re-
quire him to discover the fact of it. It is also the general rule that 
notice is unnecessary when the guarantor has led the creditor to 
believe that he will receive prompt knowledge of acceptance from 
the principal.132 Thus, in Lascelles v. Clark133 notice was not essen-
tial because the guarantor had informed the creditor that he ex-
pected to go into business with the principal. The fact that he did 
not do so was unimportant. 
Dealings between the creditor and the guarantor, such as a 
direct request by the creditor to the guarantor, can render notice 
superfluous. Dealings which involve an understanding relating to 
the transaction guaranteed naturally have this effect;134 but prior 
128 See Kresge Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Young, 37 A.2d 448 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1944); Milroy 
v. Quinn, 69 Ind. 406 (1879); German Sav. Bank v. Drake Roofing Co., 112 Iowa 184, 83 
N.W. 960 (1900); Lane Bros. Co. v. Sheinwald, 275 Mass. 96, 175 N.E. 148 (1931). 
129 See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Rieffer, 239 U.S. 17 (1915) (contract of indem-
nity); Hartford-Aetna Nat'! Bank v. Anderson, 92 Conn. 643, 103 Atl. 845 (1918) (contract 
of indemnity); Ferguson v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 93 Ga. App. 622, 92 S.E.2d 321 (1956), 
transaction described in Ferguson v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 115, 85 S.E.2d 
72 (1954); Mayo v. Bloomberg, 290 Mass. 168, 195 N.E. 99 (1935); Southdale Center, Inc. 
v. Lewis, 260 Minn. 430, llO N.W.2d 857 (1961) (semble) (minority rule); Stone-Ordean-
Wells Co. v. Helmer, 142 Minn. 263, 171 N.W. 924 (1919); Cowan v. Roberts, 134 N.C. 
415, 46 S.E. 979 (1904). 
130 4 App. Div. 24, 38 N.Y. Supp. 1028 (1896) (minority rule); accord, Wall v. Eccles, 
61 Utah 247, 211 Pac. 702 (1922). 
131 See text accompanying notes 169-76 infra. 
132 See text accompanying notes 141-45 infra. 
133 204 Mass. 362, 90 N.E. 875 (1910). 
134 Kierulff & Ravenscroft v. Koping, 94 Cal. App. 473, 271 Pac. 353 (1928); Vacuum 
Oil Co. v. Smookler, 282 Mass. 361, 185 N.E. 13 (1933); see Ferguson v. Atlanta Newspapers, 
Inc., 93 Ga. App. 622, 92 S.E.2d 321 (1956), transaction described in Ferguson v. Atlanta 
Newspapers, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 115, 85 S.E.2d 72 (1954); American Woolen Co. v. Moskowitz, 
159 App. Div. 382, 144 N.Y. Supp. 532 (1912) (minority rule); Powers & Weightman v. 
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dealings alone may be enough. In J.R. Watkins Medical Co. v. 
McCall, 135 for example, the guarantors had guaranteed three suc-
cessive contracts between the creditor and the principal; the court 
rejected the contention that the third offer of guaranty stood in 
need of notice of intention to accept. 
Guaranty as Acceptance. Judges sometimes state that notice 
of intention to accept is unnecessary when the creditor has asked 
the guarantor for a guaranty, because the request constitutes an 
offer which is accepted by the promise to guaranty.136 They reason 
that a creditor-offeror has no obligation to notify a guarantor-
offeree of receipt of his acceptance.137 This explanation is fallacious 
with regard to the typical unilateral contract of guaranty. The 
creditor is not the offeror in the ordinary situation,138 so that the 
guarantor's response to his request cannot be an acceptance. Notice 
is dispensed with because the creditor's request should make the 
guarantor anticipate acceptance. 
It is likewise erroneous to justify dispensing with notice on the 
ground that the guaranty is an "acceptance," when the guaranty 
was sought by the creditor as partial consideration for a promise 
to the principal.139 While the guaranty does constitute a partial 
acceptance of the creditor's proposal, the offer of a guaranty must 
itself be accepted in accordance with its terms. Thus notice of 
intention to accept could be required. It is not essential only be-
cause the creditor's offer should cause the guarantor to expect 
acceptance. 
It is, of course, possible for a creditor to propose a unilateral 
contract of guaranty in which he would be the promisor. The 
guarantor's accomplishment of the requested act, e.g., pledging a 
chattel, would constitute an acceptance in this case, and, since the 
guarantor is the offeree, the creditor would not be obliged to send 
him notice. However, the guaranty is more likely to be an accept-
ance when a bilateral contract of guaranty is involved. If the 
creditor promises the guarantor to extend credit in return for a 
Bumcratz, 12 Ohio St. 273 (1861) (semble) (guaranty named the parties in definite terms) 
(minority rule). 
135 Il6 Minn. 389, 133 N.W. 966 (1911); accord, Public Fire Ins. Co. v. Weatherly, 148 
Ore. 407, 412, 36 P.2d 989, 991 (1934) (dictum). But see Ladd &: Bush v. Hayes, 105 F.2d 
292 (9th Cir. 1939). 
136 See Campbell 538. 
137 Cf. Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915). 
138 See 1 CORBIN § 68, at 215. 
139 See Cooke v. Orne, 37 Ill. 186 (1865); Wildes v. Savage, 29 Fed. Cas. 1226 (No. 
17653) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (altemative holding). 
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promise to guarantee, the guaranty is an acceptance which forms 
a bilateral contract.140 
Guarantor's Knowledge of Acceptance. Prompt knowledge of 
acceptance enables the guarantor to know where he stands; there 
is no occasion for notice of intention to accept. 
Receipt of notice of transactions141 or notice of default within 
a reasonable time after the creditor has entered upon performance 
furnishes this knowledge. So does knowledge that the creditor has 
done the requested act.142 Detroit Free Press v. Pattengill,143 makes 
it clear, however, that the latter type of knowledge must be coupled 
with reasonable grounds to believe the act was performed with 
intention to accept the guaranty. 
If the guarantor is present at the time that the creditor per-
forms, notice is obviously unnecessary. The guarantor, for ex-
ample, might be looking on when the creditor sells the principal 
goods in reliance on the guaranty144 or signs a contract with the 
principal which the guaranty secures.145 
Consideration moving from the creditor to the guarantor pro-
vides knowledge of intention to accept. In Barker v. Scudder,146 
for instance, the creditor sold land to the guarantor in return for 
cash and the notes of a third party guaranteed as to collectibility. 
Notice was not required., Transfer of the land by the creditor 
manifested his intention to accept the guaranty. 
Acknowledgment of receipt of consideration in the guaranty 
is evidence that the guarantor has knowledge of intention to 
140 Cf. Shows v. Steiner, Lohman & Frank, 175 Ala. 363, 57 So. 700 (1911), for an ex-
ample of the relatively rare bilateral contract of guaranty. 
141 Straight v. Wight, 60 Minn. 515, 63 N.W. 105 (1895). 
142 Rich v. Clayton Mark & Co., 250 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1957); Powell v. Chicago Carpet 
Co., 22 Ill. App. 409 (1887); First Nat'l Bank v. Carpenter, Stibbs & Co., 41 Iowa 518 (1875); 
R. F. Grace Printing & Mfg. Co. v. Arnaud's Drug Stores, Inc., 10 La. App. 298, 121 So. 359 
(1929); Menard v. Scudder, 7 La. Ann. 385 (1852); Train & Co. v. Jones, 11 Vt. 444 (1839); 
see Harvey v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 Neb. 320, 76 N.W. 870 (1898). 
143 155 Mich. 272, 118 N.W. 927 (1908); accord, Coe & Richmond v. Buehler, 110 Pa. 
366, 5 Atl. 20 (1885). Compare Bascom v. Smith, 164 Mass. 61, 41 N.E. 130 (1895). 
144 Mitchell & Bro. v. Railton, 45 Mo. App. 273 (1891). 
145 Closson v. Billman, 161 Ind. 610, 69 N.E. 449 (1904). When the offer of guaranty is 
appended to the contract between the principal and the creditor and bears an even date, 
it is presumed that they were executed contemporaneously. Siegel & Co. v. Baily, 252 Pa. 
231, 97 Atl. 401 (1916); see Beeson v. LaVasque, 144 Ark. 522, 223 S.W. 355 (1920); Daven-
port v. Stratton, 24 Cal. 2d 232, 149 P.2d 4 (1944); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. Badon, 
17 La. App. 114, 135 So. 631 (1931); Steinberg v. Gonzales, 215 Md. 100, 135 A.2d 631 
(1957); Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Jones, 61 Mo. 409 (1875); Douglass v. Howland, 24 
Wend. 35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (minority rule). But see American Agricultural Chem. Co. 
v. Ellsworth, 109 Me. 195, 83 Atl. 546 (1912). 
146 56 Mo. 272 (1874); see International Supply Co. v. Chem. Process Co., 190 Okla 
224, 122 P .2d 137 (1942). 
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accept147 if the acknowledgment affirmatively indicates that the 
consideration was paid to the guarantor by the creditor.148 The 
mere words "for value received" are not adequate.149 On the other 
hand, a proper acknowledgment of consideration will be ignored 
when it is fictitious. In American Agricultural Chem. Co. v. Ells-
worth,150 for instance, the court disregarded an acknowledgment 
of consideration with these words: "The real consideration lay 
in the contract between the creditor and Berry [the principal]."151 
Since this contract had not been executed when guaranty was given, 
notice of intention to accept was required. There is language in 
some opinions which, contrary to the Ellsworth case, suggests that 
a recital of consideration conclusively dispenses with notice.152 It 
it submitted, however, that this conclusion is seldom necessary to 
the result. There are other significant facts in these decisions 
which explain why notice was not required. In Davis v. Wells,153 
for example, the guaranty was given primarily to secure the 
existing indebtedness of the principal.154 
The Insider Rule. If the guarantor has a close relationship 
with the principal which enables him to obtain inside information, 
he will ordinarily be treated as though he anticipated acceptance 
or gained prompt knowledge of it. This is true when the principal 
is a small corporation and the guarantors are stockholders, officers 
or directors,155 or where the principal is a partnership and the 
147 See Davis v. Wells, 104 U.S. 159 (1881); Huckaby v. McConnon &: Co., 213 Ala. 
631, 105 So. 886 (1925); Taylor v. Tolman Co., 47 Ill. App. 264 (1893); Buhrer v. Baldwin, 
137 Mich. 263, 100 N.W. 468 (1904); Howe v. Nichels, 22 Me. 175 (1842) (alternative hold-
ing); Century lndem. Co. v. Bloom, 329 Mass. 508, 513, 109 N.E.2d 166, 168 (1952) 
(dictum) (contract of indemnity). 
148 Barnes Cycle Co. v. Reed, 84 Fed. 603 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898), rev'd on other grounds, 
91 Fed. 481 (3d Cir. 1899). 
140 Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Richards, 115 U.S. 524 (1885). 
150 109 Me. 195, 83 Atl. 546 (1912); see Greer Mach. Co. v. Sears, 119 Ky. 697, 66 S."W. 
521 (1902); Tolman Co. v. Means, 52 Mo. App. 385 (1893); Coe &: Richmond v. Buehler, 
110 Pa. 366, 5 Atl. 20 (1885). 
m 109 Me. 195, 198, 83 Atl. 546, 547 (1912). 
152 See, e.g., Davis v. Wells, 104 U.S. 159, 167 (1881). 
153 104 U.S. 159 (1881). 
154 Wells, Fargo &: Co. v. Davis, 2 Utah 411 (1878), afj'd on other grounds, sub nom. 
Davis v. Wells, 104 U.S. 159, 167 (1881); see text accompanying notes 169-72 infra. 
165 Bond v. John V. Farwell Co., 172 Fed. 58 (6th Cir. 1909) (alternative holding) (share-
holders and directors); Hibernia Bank&: Trust Co. v. Succession of Cancienne, 140 La. 969, 
74 So. 267 (1917) (alternative holding) (director); see Rawleigh, Moses &: Co. v. Kornberg, 
210 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1954) (officers); Thorpe v. Story, 10 Cal. 2d 104, 73 P.2d 1194 (1937) 
(shareholders and directors); Sanders v. Etcherson, 36 Ga. 404 (1867) (shareholders); New 
Idea Spreader Co. v. Satterfield, 45 Idaho 753, 265 Pac. 644 (1928) (directors); McGowan 
v. Wells' Trustees, 184 Ky. 772, 213 S.W. 573 (1919) (shareholders and officers); Gentzel v. 
Dodge, 271 Mass. 499, 17 N.E. 454 (1930) (officer); Goodhue County Nat'! Bank v. Fleming, 
168 Minn. 50, 209 N.W. 533 (1926) (shareholder) (minority rule); Doebler Die Casting Co. 
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guarantor is a partner.156 It is sufficient if the guarantor has a per-
sonal interest in acceptance plus an opportunity to obtain inside 
information. These individuals include: a salesman who guarantees 
payment of a customer's order on which he receives a commis-
sion;157 a landlord who guarantees his tenant's debt to forestall 
collection proceedings which would deprive the tenant of the abil-
ity to pay rent; 158 and the exclusive brokers or sales agents of the 
principal who guarantee payment to his suppliers.159 
Waiver. The offer may expressly160 or impliedly waive 
notice.161 The most common form of implied waiver is a provision 
in the offer which deals with notice but does not specifically men-
tion notice of intention to accept. For instance, notice has been 
dispensed with when the following provisions were present: 
"I also waive my rights to notice of any and all transactions 
with said L. E. McKinnon and his failure to pay his indebted-
ness to you."162 
v. Holmes, 52 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944) (officer) (minority rule); Wise v. 
Miller, 45 Ohio St. 388, 14 N.E. 218 (1887) (shareholder) (minority rule); State Bank v. 
King, 244 Pa. 29, 90 Atl. 453 (1914) (shareholders); Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 56 
S.D. 410, 228 N.W. 809 (1930) (shareholders); Mountain City Mill Co. v. Lindsey, 8 Tenn. 
App. 337 (1928) (shareholders) (minority rule). 
156 Union Bank v. Coster's Ex'rs, 3 N.Y. 203 (1850) (semble) (minority rule); Cozzani 
v. Fioravanti, 51 R.I. 433, 155 Atl. 409 (1931). Contra, Farmers' Bank v. Tatnall, 12 Del. 
(7 Houst.) 287, 31 Atl. 879 (1885) (semble). 
157 See Mccarroll v. Red Diamond Clothing Co., 105 Ark. 443, 151 S.W. 1012 (1912); 
Richmond Paper Co. v. Bradley, ll5 Miss. 307, 75 So. 381, new trial ordered on other 
grounds, II5 Miss. 534, 76 So. 544 (1917). But cf. Dondero v. Standard Emblem Co., 45 R.I. 
329, 332-33, 121 Atl. 401, 402 (1923) (dictum). 
158 See Greene v. Simon Brown's Sons, 128 S.C. 91, 121 S.E. 597 (1924); F. C. Palmer &: 
Co. v. Chaffee, 129 Wash. 408, 225 Pac. 65 (1924). 
159 See Hassell-Hughes Lumber Co. v. Jackson, 33 Tenn. App. 477, 232 S.W.2d 325 
(1949) (minority rule). The insider rule is also applicable to the owner of a lot on which 
a building is being constructed who guarantees his contractor's suppliers. See Vvehle v. 
Baker, 97 Ga. App. Ill, 102 S.E.2d 661 (1958); Squires v. Hoffman, 278 S.'W. 803 (Mo. App. 
1926); Wilcox v. Draper, 12 Neb. 138, IO N.W. 579 (1881) (minority rule). It is also applica-
ble to an individual who guarantees payment by a principal with whom he has a profit-
sharing agreement. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Cassidy, 194 Ky. 81, 238 S.W. 172 (1922). 
160 Hickey Pipe &: Supply Co. v. Fitzgerald, 3 Cal. App. 2d 389, 39 P.2d 472 (1934); 
Guggenheimer &: Co. v. Gilmore, 29 Ga. App. 540, ll6 S.E. 67 (1923); Valley Nat'l Bank v. 
Cownie, 164 Iowa 421, 145 N.W. 904 (1914); Hughes v. Roberts, Johnson & Rand Shoe Co., 
24 Ky. L. Rep. 2003, 72 S.W. 799 (1903); Industrial Bank &: Trust Co. v. Hesselberg, 195 
S.W.2d 470 (Mo. 1946); Penner v. International Harvester Co., 171 Okla. 41, 41 P.2d 843 
(1935); International Text Book Co. v. Mabbott, 159 Wis. 423, 150 N.W. 429 (1915). 
161 If notice is lacking when required and there is no waiver, the guarantor is released 
from liability on his guaranty. Texas Co. v. Stanberry, 165 S.W .2d 696 (Mo. App. 1942) 
(per curiam). 
162 Phillips-Boyd Pub. Co. v. McKinnon, 197 Ala. 443, 444, 73 So. 43, 44 (1916); cf. 
Holmes v. Schwab &: Sons, 141 Ga. 44, 80 S.E. 313 (1913); Crittenden v. Fiske, 46 Mich. 70, 
8 N.W. 714 (1881). 
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"[W]e hereby hold ourselves accountable to you for the pay-
ment of the same, in case Mr. Daniel Totty should not be able 
so to do, or should make default; of which default you are 
required to give us reasonable and proper notice.''163 
"I reserve the right to terminate my liability on this guarantee 
by written notice thereof to the bank, except as to obligations 
and indebtedness incurred by the debtor prior to such notice; 
but I agree nothing shall affect my liability on this guarantee 
except such notice, or the surrender or cancellation of this 
guarantee by the bank."164 
81 
It appears that if the offer shows that the guarantor was notice-
conscious it must expressly provide for notice of intention to accept 
or it will be waived. Notice is also impliedly waived when the 
guaranty states that it is unconditional165 or that the guarantor is 
jointly or jointly and severally liable with the principal.166 
Farwell & Co. v. Sully101 signifies that a subsequent waiver is 
as efficacious as a waiver in the offer. When the creditor in Sully 
informed the guarantor that the principal was bankrupt, the 
guarantor replied: "Prove up your claim in bankruptcy and draw 
dividends. I will make my guarantee good.'' The court held that 
this subsequent promise to pay put the question of notice of in-
tention to accept out of the case. A subsequent acknowledgment 
of liability is given the same effect.168 
Definite Principal Performance. An offer to guaranty a single 
specified transaction of definite amount does not normally require 
notice of intention to accept. Smith & Crittenden v. Dann, for 
163 Wadsworth v. Allen, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.) 174, 175 (1851); Platter v. Green, 26 Kan. 
252 (1881) (alternative holding). But cf. David B. Taylor & Co. v. McClung's Ex'r, 7 Del. 
(2 Houst.) 24 (1858). 
104 See Century Indem. Co. v. Bloom, 329 Mass. 508, 109 N.E.2d 166 (1952) (contract 
of indemnity); Midland Nat'l Bank v. Security Elevator Co., 161 Minn. 30, 32, 200 N.W. 
851, 852 (1924). 
105 Jones v. Mccannon & Co., 100 Fla. 1158, 130 So. 760 (1930); McConnon & Co. v. 
Prine, 128 Miss. 192, 90 So. 730 (1922). 
106 Dayton Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Sabra, 31 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1929). This result has been 
justified both on the theory that a joint or joint and several promise is not a guaranty 
and thus does not require notice, see Campbell 532 n.12, and on the theory that the joint 
relationship between the principal and the guarantor entitles the creditor to assume that 
the guarantor will be apprised of acceptance, see REsl°ATEMENT, SECURITY § 86, comment 
C (1941). 
167 38 Iowa 387 (1874); accord, Swisher v. Deering, 104 Ill. App. 572 (1902) (alternative 
holding), aff'd on other grounds, 204 Ill. 203, 68 N.E. 517 (1903). 
10s Trefethen v. Locke, 16 La. Ann. 19 (1861); City Nat'l Bank v. Phelps, 86 N.Y. 484 
(1881) (minority rule); see Gunther v. Pfaffman, 18 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 311, 33 Ohio C.C. 
Dec. 54 (1911), aff'd mem., 88 Ohio St. 528, 106 N.E. 1072 (1913) (minority rule); cf. Reynolds, 
Byrne & Co. v. Douglass, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 497 (1838). 
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instance, concerned a guaranty of a single sale in the amount of 
one hundred dollars.169 Other examples include: guaranties of 
notes; 170 guaranties of payment for a specified amount of goods;171 
and guaranties of payment of existing debt.172 Since the guarantor 
can plan on the extent of his liability, most jurisdictions have found 
that it is not unreasonable to require him to discover whether the 
transaction has been consummated. Pennsylvania, however, seems 
to require notice. T. G. Evans & Co. v. McCormick173 held that 
notice was necessary despite the guarantor's knowledge that the 
principal's obligation amounted to "about seven hundred dollars." 
Countervailing circumstances may make notice vital although 
a definite principal performance is the subject of the guaranty. If 
the guaranty is made "to whom it may concern,"174 or contains 
qualified language,175 or the offeror is particularly uncertain as to 
whether he is an acceptable guarantor,176 notice may be required. 
Presence of a Seal. Campbell has suggested that notice of in-
tention to accept is unnecessary when the offer of guaranty is under 
seal.177 This is an over-generalization even aside from statutory 
modification of the effect of the seal.178 Although a sealed document 
is effective on delivery rather than on acceptance, delivery may be 
constructively conditioned on receipt of notice of intention to 
accept.179 The guaranty in Farmer's Bank v. Tatnall,180 for instance, 
was sealed and contained a witnessing clause. The court neverthe-
169 6 Hill 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844) (minority rule); see Hays v. Smith, 65 Okla. 113, 
164 Pac. 470 (1916). 
170 See Empire Security Co. v. Berry, 211 Ill. App. 278 (1918); Shropshire v. Smith, 37 
S.W. 174, rev'd on other grounds, 37 S.W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896). 
171 Pressed Radiator Co. v. Hughes, 155 Ill. App. 80 (1910); Kline v. Raymond, 70 
Ind. 271 (1880); see Bank of Plant City v. Canal-Commercial Trust 8: Sav. Bank, 270 Fed. 
477 (5th Cir. 1921); Murphy v. Continental Supply Co., 188 Ark. 183, 65 S.W.2d 25 (1933). 
112 Winnebago Paper Mills v. Travis, 56 Minn. 480, 58 N.W. 36 (1894); Wells, Fargo 
8: Co. v. Davis, 2 Utah 411 (1878), afj'd on other grounds, sub nom. Davis v. Wells, 104 
U.S. 159 (1881); see Klein v. Kern, 94 Tenn. 34, 37, 28 S.W. 295, 296 (1894) (dictum) 
(minority rule). 
173 167 Pa. 247, 31 Atl. 563 (1895) (per curiam). 
174 See Adams, Cunningham & Co. v. Jones, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 207 (1838). 
175 See Meyer v. Ruhstadt, 66 Ill. App. 346 (1896). 
176 See Dondero v. Standard Emblem Co., 45 R.I. 329, 332-33, 121 Atl. 401, 402 (1923) 
(dictum). 
177 Campbell 543-44; see United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Riefler, 239 U.S. 17 (1915) 
(contract of indemnity). 
178 Over half of the states no longer recognize the seal as a substitution for considera-
tion. See Braucher, Status of the Seal Today, 9 PRAc. LAw. 97 (1963). 
179 See 1 CORBIN § 245, at 812. 
180 12 Del. (7 Houst.) 287, 31 Atl. 879 (1885); accord, Winnebago Paper Mills v. Travis, 
56 Minn. 480, 58 N.W. 36 (1894); Acme Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 197 Pa. 359, 47 Atl. 205 (1900); 
Columbia Baking & Mfg. Co. v. Schissler, 35 Pa. Super. 621 (1908). 
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less held that notice was essential, stressing that the guarantor had 
no assurance that his offer would be accepted. 
3. Statutes 
Four states currently have in effect a version of section 1539 of 
David Dudley Field's Draft New York Civil Code: 
"A mere offer to guaranty is not binding until notice of its 
acceptance is communicated by the guarantee to the guar-
antor; but an absolute guaranty is binding upon the guarantor 
without notice of acceptance."181 
Although this statute was drafted to express New York's version 
of the minority rule, it has been construed in accord with the 
majority rule.182 
California has amended the section as follows: 
"Unless notice of acceptance is expressly required, an offer to 
become surety may be accepted by acting upon it, or by accept-
ance upon other consideration. An absolute suretyship 
obligation is binding upon the surety without notice of ac-
ceptance. "183 
No cases construing the California amendment have been found. 
On its face, however, it appears to adopt the minority rule that the 
exigency of notice turns on the wording of the offer. Two New 
York minority rule cases suggest that implication of a need for 
notice from the terms of the offer would constitute an express 
requirement for notice within the statute.184 
North Dakota has a unique statute requiring notice of intention 
to accept unless the benefit of the statute is specifically renounced: 185 
"In every case in which a manufacturer, wholesaler or distribu-
tor hereafter requires a present or prospective agent, salesman, 
or dealer to secure the signature of a surety or guarantor to a 
bond or guaranty for the purpose of delivery of merchandise 
181 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 30-106 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-01-06 (1960); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 15, § 326 (1937); S.D. CODE § 26-0106 (1939). 
182 See Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Church, II N.D. 420, 92 N.W. 805 (1902); William 
Deering&: Co. v. Mortell, 21 S.D. 159, 110 N.W. 86 (1906); Abbott v. National Bank of 
Commerce, 176 Okla. 629, 630, 56 P.2d 886, 888 (1936) (dissenting opinion). Contra, id. 
at 630, 56 P.2d at 887 (dictum). 
183 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2795. 
184 Beckman v. Hale, 17 Johns. Cas. 134 (N.Y. Sup. CL Albany County 1819); Stafford 
v. Low, 16 Johns. Cas. 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County 1819), as explained in Douglass v. 
Howland, 24 Wend. 35, 51 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (dictum). 
185 Cf. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Vangen, 116 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1962). 
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to such agent, salesman or dealer, such manufacturer, whole-
saler or distributor shall furnish such surety or guarantor a 
correct copy of the bond or obligation, together with notice 
of acceptance by the manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor, 
and setting forth to such surety or guarantor his right to with-
draw as herein provided, either by registered or certified mail 
or personal delivery prior to the first shipment of any merchan-
dise for which such surety or guarantor might become liable."186 
A related North Dakota statute gives a statutory right of revocation 
to the guarantor: 
"Each surety or guarantor to any such bond or obligation shall 
have ten days time after his receipt of such copy and notice 
during which he may give notice either by mail or personal 
delivery to the manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor of his 
withdrawal from any such bond or obligation, and shall in 
the event of his giving such notice of withdrawal as herein 
provided incur no liability under any such bond or obligation 
to such manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor."187 
4. Conclusion 
There is substantial uniformity among the American decisions 
regarding notice of intention to accept. The principal theoretical 
disagreement concerns the method of determining when notice is 
necessary. Factual comparison of the authorities, however, indicates 
that this disagreement has seldom led to varying results. 
Ill. NOTICE OF TRANSACTIONS 
Notice of transactions was first considered a constructive con-
dition of unilateral contracts of guaranty by Justice Story in Doug-
lass v. Reynolds, Byrne & Co.188 Notice of transactions was not 
requisite under English law unless called for by express and ex-
plicit language.189 Story later emphasized that the American 
departure from the English position was limited to exceptional 
situations.190 
186 N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-01-06.1 (1960). 
187 N.D. CENT. GODE § 22-01-06.2 (1960). 
188 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113, 126 (1833) (dictum). 
189 Somersall v. Bameby, Cro. Jae. 287, 79 Eng. Rep. 246 (K.B. 1611) (contract of 
indemnity); cf. Oxley v. Young, 2 H. Bl. 613, 126 Eng. Rep. 734 (1796); see RoWLA1T, 
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY 91 (3d ed. 1936). 
190 See Wildes v. Savage, 29 Fed. Cas. 1226, 1230-31 (No. 17653) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) 
(dictum); see 1 STORY, CONTRACTS 359-60 (1st ed. 1844). 
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The existence of the concept of notice of transactions has not 
been generally recognized. Arant, Simpson, Stearns, and Williston 
do not mention it.191 The last three authors actually confused 
notice of transactions with notice of intention to accept. In refer-
ring to "notice of acceptance" they stated that failure to receive 
notice discharged the guarantor only when he suffered loss. The 
cases they cited, however, made this point with regard to notice of 
transactions, not notice of intention to accept.192 Professor Camp-
bell, on the other hand, found three strands of authority concerned 
with notice of transactions: (I) jurisdictions which sometimes re-
quired notice of transactions; (2) jurisdictions which never did; 
and (3) Massachusetts, which, under Bishop v. Eaton,193 demanded 
notice when the creditor should have known that the guarantor 
would not receive prompt information concerning the creditor's 
performance.194 
It is submitted that Professor Campbell was substantially cor-
rect in his analysis except for the weight that he gave to Bishop v. 
Eaton as a distinctive approach. Although the case has enjoyed 
academic approval,195 Bishop v. Eaton has not been widely followed. 
Furthermore, subsequent Massachusetts decisions have treated it 
as in accord with cases in other jurisdictions, 196 as Professor Camp-
bell was forced to concede.197 
The principal theoretical division of authority consists of (I) 
a rule which makes notice a constructive condition when the offer 
leaves indefinite the amount of credit which may be extended; 
and (2) a rule which refuses to make notice of transactions a con-
structive condition. There are also a few cases which indicate that 
notice of transactions can be only a constructive condition of 
guaranties of collection.198 
A. Notice as a Constructive Condition: 
The Old Majority Rule 
It is doubtful whether the ensuing discussion of notice of 
transactions as a constructive condition deals with living law. The 
191 ARANT § 26; SIMPSON § 25; STEARNS §§ 4.15-.17; 1 WILLISTON §§ 69A-69AA. 
192 See SIMPSON § 25, at 68 n.5; STEARNS at 81 n.9; 1 WILLISTON § 69A, at 22 n.14. 
10a 161 Mass. 496, 500, 37 N.E. 665, 667-68 (1894) (dictum). 
104 Campbell 545-551. 
195 See authorities cited note 61 supra. 
100 See, e.g., Black, Starr &: Frost v. Grabow, 216 Mass. 516, 104 N.E. 346 (1914). 
197 See Campbell 550. 
10s See text accompanying notes 216-17 infra for the distinction between a guaranty of 
collection and guaranty of payment. 
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basic principles were laid down in old cases that have not been 
reaffirmed.199 Nevertheless, analysis of notice of transactions is 
more than empty scholarship, for inadvertent confusion of notice 
of transactions and notice of intention to accept has produced un-
fortunate conclusions. 
The majority of American jurisdictions made notice of trans-
actions a constructive condition when it would aid the guarantor 
in planning his affairs. If the offer of guaranty left indefinite the 
amount of credit for which the guarantor might ultimately become 
liable within a reasonable time, notice of transactions was con-
sidered essential unless other circumstances rebutted this inference. 
Notice of transactions was demanded when the guaranty was not 
expressly limited either as to duration or as to the amount of credit 
guaranteed;200 when it was limited in amount of credit but not in 
duration;201 and when it was limited in duration but not in amount 
of credit.202 If the guaranty was for both a limited duration and a 
limited amount of credit, notice of transactions was not exacted.203 
The significant facts which rendered notice of intention to 
accept redundant had the same effect on notice of transactions. 
Thus, if the guarantor should have anticipated the transactions 
guaranteed, notice was not a constructive condition. In Caton v. 
Shaw & Tiffany,204 for example, notice was not required when the 
principal had informed the guarantor that the creditor desired his 
personal guaranty. Notice was also unnecessary when the guarantor 
received prompt knowledge of transactions.205 If he had a close 
relationship with the principal which would enable him to obtain 
inside information, e.g., he was an officer, director, or stockholder 
of the principal, the guarantor was usually treated as _though he 
had anticipated the transactions guaranteed or had gained prompt 
199 See Campbell 548. 
200 Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Mills, 55 Iowa 543, 8 N.W. 356 (1881): Clark v. Reming• 
ton, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 361 (1846) (alternative holding); Lester Piano Co. v. Romney, 41 
Utah 436, 126 Pac. 325 (1912) (alternative holding). 
201 See Rapelye &: Purdy v. Bailey, 3 Conn. 438 (1820); M. Ferst &: Co. v. Blackwell, 39 
Fla. 621, 22 So. 892 (1897); Whiting v. Stacy, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 270 (1860); Douglass v. 
Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113, 126 (1832) (dictum); Beitler v. Rudkin, 104 
Conn. 404, 410-12, 133 Atl. 214, 216 (1926) (dictum); Bank v. Sloo &: Byrne, 16 La. 539 (1840) 
(alternative holding). 
202 See Babcock v. Bryant, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 133 (1832). 
20s See Wildes v. Savage, 29 Fed. Cas. 1226 (No. 17653) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839); Montgomery 
v. Kellogg &: Sandusky, 43 Miss. 486 (1870). 
204 2 Har. &: Gill 13 (Md. 1827). 
205 Noyes &: Co. v. Nichols, 28 Vt. 159 (1855); see Menard v. Scudder, 7 La. Ann. 385 
(1852). 
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knowledge of them.206 The offer of guaranty could expressly207 or 
impliedly waive notice of transactions. A provision that the guar-
anty was in force until revoked by written notice was one form of 
implied waiver.208 Receipt of notice of default or notice of inten-
tion to accept affected the utility of notice of transactions. If 
notice of default was given within the time that notice of trans-
actions was due, the latter was rendered superfluous.200 Notice of 
intention to accept usually had the same effect because it should 
have led the guarantor to anticipate transactions in reliance on 
the guaranty.210 
The guarantor was discharged to the extent that loss followed 
from delayed notice of transactions.211 If lack of notice prevented 
him from protecting his rights of recourse against the principal, 
he was totally discharged.212 If it misled him into allowing special 
damage to occur, he was discharged pro tanto.218 
In Cremer v. Higginson214 the principal passed from a solvent 
to an insolvent condition between the time when notice should 
have been received and the time that it actually was received. The 
court held that the guarantor was wholly discharged. Cremer in-
volved a situation in which courts have presumed that the guaran-
tor was irreparably injured by tardy notice of transactions. Timely 
notice would have alerted him to the extent of his possible liability 
before it accrued. He could then have endeavored to protect him-
self from deterioration in the principal's financial condition. He 
could have demanded security and been prepared to assert his 
rights of subrogation, exoneration, contribution, and reimburse-
ment immediately upon default. Because the actual amount of loss 
200 See Standard Roller Bearing Co. v. Bergdoll, 214 Fed. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1914) (Louis J. 
Bergdoll guarantor, Louis J. Bergdoll Motor Co. principal); Boyd &: Rickets v. Snyder, 49 
Md. 325 (1878) (directors of brewing company guarantors, their agent principal); Glouces-
ter Mut. Fishing Ins. Co. v. Boyer, 294 Mass. 35, 200 N.E. 557 (1936) (guarantors shareholders 
of principal); cf. Eastern Shore Brokerage &: Comm'n Co. v. Harrison, 141 Md. 91, 118 Atl. 
192 (1922). 
207 New Haven County Bank v. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 206 (1842); see Merchants Nat'l 
Bank v. Ayers, 37 ,vyo. 136, 259 Pac. 804 (1927). An e.xpress waiver of notice of transactions 
may be considered impliedly to waive notice of intention to accept. Phillips-Boyd Pub. 
Co. v. McKinnon, 197 Ala. 443, 73 So. 43 (1916). 
208 Century Indem. Co. v. Bloom, 329 Mass. 508, 109 N.E.2d 166 (1952) (contract of 
indemnity); Frieden v. Cluett, Peabody &: Co., 142 Va. 738, 128 S.E. 61 (1925). 
::wo See Ajax Rubber Co. v. Gam, 30 Del. (7 Boyce) 479, 108 At!. 276 (1919) (per curiam). 
210 See I STORY, op. cit. supra note 190, at 359-60. But see Cremer v. Higginson, 6 Fed. 
Cas. 797 (No. 3383) (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (alternative holding). 
211 Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (IO How.) 461, 475 (1850) (dictum). 
212 See Campbell 548-49. 
21s See ibid.; Louisville Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 51 U.S. (IO How.) 461 (1850). 
214 6 Fed. Cas. 797 (No. 3383) (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
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that the guarantor might thus have avoided was not capable of 
precise determination, his interests were safeguarded by the assump-
tion that he could have fully protected his rights of recourse and 
was irreparably damaged when deprived of the opportunity to do 
so. Later cases like German Sav. Bank v. Drake Roofing Co.215 
established that the time at which the principal became insolvent 
was crucial. In the German Sav. Bank case the principal was in-
solvent at the time at which notice of transactions was due. Since 
the prior insolvency of the principal precluded the guarantor from 
taking effective steps to protect his rights of recourse, the court 
held that failure to receive prompt notice did not discharge the 
guarantor. Even in this situation, however, dilatory notice of trans-
actions could cause the guarantor to incur special damage and 
obtain a pro tanto discharge. For example, he might be misled into 
surrendering security in the belief that the debt had been paid by 
the principal. 
B. Notice as a Constructive Condition of Guaranties of 
Collection: A Questionable Rule · 
The typical guaranty is a guaranty of payment. The guarantor 
undertakes to pay if the principal does not.216 But the guarantor 
may restrict his undertaking to the solvency of the principal debtor. 
If he promises to pay only if payment can not be procured from 
the principal by legal proceedings, his guaranty is called a guaranty 
of collection.217 The Supreme Court of Kentucky declared in 
McGowan v. Wells' Trustee218 that notice of transactions might 
be a constructive condition of a guaranty of collection but not of a 
guaranty of payment. Alabama can also be deemed to have adopted 
this view. Walker v. Forbes219 stated that a creditor might have 
to give notice of transactions to a guarantor of collection. Cahuzac 
& Co. v. Samini220 found notice unnecessary with regard to a guaran-
tor of payment. 
The "rule" of the above cases is more fiction than fact. Each 
would have been decided the same way under the former majority 
rule. McGowan v. Wells' Trustee dispensed with notice when the 
215 112 Iowa 184, 83 N.W. 960 (1900) (alternative holding); see Beebe v. Dudley, 26 
N.H. 249 (1853). 
216 See STEARNS § 1.5, at 5. 
217 See id. at 6. 
21s 184 Ky. 772, 780-81, 213 S.W. 573, 578 (1919) (dictum). 
219 25 Ala. 139, 147-48 (1854) (dictum). 
220 29 Ala. 288 (1856). 
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guarantors were officers and directors of the principal. Cahuzac & 
Co. v. Samini did likewise when notice of intention to accept had 
been received. On the other hand, Walker v. Forbes demanded 
notice for a guaranty unlimited in duration. 
C. Notice as an Express Condition: 
The New Majority Rule 
Jurisdictions which do not readily require notice of intention 
to accept221 should take a similar position with regard to notice 
of transactions. Although all these jurisdictions do not have author-
ity on point, this seems to be the case.222 Notice of transactions is 
not called for unless the offer expressly and explicitly provides for 
it. The atrophy of the old majority rule has made this the prevail-
ing opinion. A recent Florida case, for example, approves it.223 
D. Statutes 
Five states have enacted subtantially the following statute: "A 
suretyship obligation is to be deemed unconditional unless its 
terms import some condition precedent to the liability of the guar-
antor."224 Although the provision seems relevant to notice of trans-
actions, it has been neglected by the courts.225 
North Dakota has supplemented this section with a unique 
provision requiring notice in certain situations unless the applica-
tion of the statute is explicitly waived: 226 
"In every case in which the manufacturer, wholesaler or 
distributor is furnishing merchandise to any agent, salesman 
or dealer whose execution of bond or obligation to such man-
ufacturer, wholesaler or distributor has been joined in by any 
surety or guarantor, such manufacturer, wholesaler or dis-
tributor shall each month during the life of such bond or 
obligation furnish each such surety or guarantor either by mail 
221 Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Tennessee imply a requirement of 
notice of intention to accept only from a term of the offer. The majority of American juris-
dictions also imply a requirement from circumstances surrounding the making of the offer. 
222 M. Lowenstein &: Sons, Inc. v. Roselle Mfg. Co., 9 Misc. 2d 617, 171 N.Y.S.2d 7 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), afj'd mem., 8 App. Div. 2d 592, 185 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1959); Whit-
ney&: Schuyler v. Groot, 24 Wend. 82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840); Hassell-Hughes Lumber Co. 
v. Jackson, 33 Tenn. App. 477, 232 S.W.2d 325 (1949). 
223 Bryant v. Food Mach. &: Chem. Corp., 130 So. 2d 132 (Fla. App. 1961) (per curiam). 
224 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2806; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 30-201 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 22-01-09 (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 331 (1937); S.D. REv. CoDE § 26-0109 (1939). 
225 See, e.g., REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, MONT. ANNOT. 28 (1940). 
226 Cf. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Vangen, 116 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1962). 
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or personal delivery a statement showing the debit and credit 
items incurred and made in the account between the manu-
facturer, wholesaler or distributor and such agent, salesman 
or dealer during the immediately preceding month and the 
exact balance owing from the agent, salesman or dealer thereon 
at date of such notice."227 
E. Position of the American Law Institute 
Section fifty-six of the Restatement of Contracts provides: 
"Where forbearance or an act other than a promise is the con-
sideration for a promise, no notification that the act or for-
bearance has been given is necessary to complete the contract. 
But if the offeror has no adequate means of ascertaining with 
reasonable promptness and certainty that the act or forbear-
ance has been given, and the offeree should know this, the con-
tract is discharged unless within a reasonable time after per-
formance of the act or forbearance, the offeree exercises 
reasonable diligence to notify the offeror thereof."228 
Williston, the reporter for this section of the Restatement of Con-
tracts, patterned it after a dictum in the celebrated Massachusetts 
case of Bishop v. Eaton.229 The cases cited by the Massachusetts 
court in support of the dictum dealt with notice of transactions;230 
but the court seemed to be referring to notice of intention to accept 
when it stated that "notice of acceptance" should be received within 
a reasonable time after performance by the creditor in order to fore-
stall the guarantor's discharge. The significance of the resultant 
221 N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-01-063. See text accompanying notes 186-87 supra for two 
companion North Dakota statutes requiring notice of intention to accept and permitting 
revocation of the offer of guaranty within ten days of its receipt. 
228 1 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 56 (1932). REsTATEMENT, SECURITY § 86 (1941) is 
similar. 
229 161 Mass. 496, 500, 37 N.E, 665, 667-68 (1894) (dictum). See 1 WILLISTON § 69AA n.15. 
280 Whiting v. Stacy, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 270 (1860); Babcock v. Bryant, 29 Mass. (12 
Pick.) 133 (1831); Schlessinger v. Dickinson, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 47 (1862) (alternative holding). 
Although there was language in the above opinions suggesting that the guarantor would 
be wholly discharged by tardy notice, the context generally made it clear that the court 
was assuming that the principal had become insolvent after the creditor's failure to send 
notice. The loss presumed to have been incurred by the guarantor, not mere lack of notice, 
was the reason that these cases referred to total discharge. 
Whiting v. Stacy is an exception. The Whiting court referred solely to the Iaches of 
the creditor in giving notice as the reason for full discharge. The cases it relied on, how-
ever, all required injury to the guarantor plus belated notice for unconditional release of 
the guarantor. See Bickford v. Gibbs, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 154 (1851) (notice of default); 
Clark v. Remington, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 361 (1846) (alternative holding); Courtis v. Dennis, 
48 Mass. (7 Met.) 510 (1844); Babcock v. Bryant, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 133 (1832). 
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ambiguity differs depending on whether a temporary or a con-
tinuing guaranty is considered. 
The time at which the dictum obliges the creditor to give notice 
is unobjectionable in the case of a temporary guaranty. Notice of 
intention to accept is due within a reasonable time after commence-
ment of performance by the creditor; notice of transactions, within 
a reasonable time after conclusion of the transaction.231 The two 
coalesce under a "one-shot" guaranty so that a single notice given 
after completion of the transaction is sufficient.232 But if the dictum 
refers to notice of transactions under a temporary guaranty, it is in-
correct in stating that failure to receive notice completely discharges 
the guarantor. As the cases cited by the Bishop v. Eaton dictum 
indicate, belated notice of transactions discharges the guarantor to 
the extent of resultant prejudice. Unconditional discharge only 
follows from inadequate notice of intention to accept.233 
The Bishop v. Eaton dictum can be criticized for both the time 
at which it declares that notice is requisite and the effect that it 
attributes to failure to receive notice with reference to a continuing 
guaranty. If the dictum deals with notice of intention to accept, it 
permits this notice after completion of the creditor's performance. 
This is a departure from the precept that notice of intention to 
accept should be given within a reasonable time after initiation of 
performance by the creditor. If the dictum refers to notice of trans-
actions, it states that failure to receive this notice wholly discharges 
the guarantor. The accepted rule is that failure to dispatch notice 
of transactions releases the guarantor to the extent of resultant loss. 
When Williston wrote the Bishop v. Eaton dictum into the 
Restatement of Contracts, he incorporated its vices as well as its 
virtues. Section fifty-six, like the dictum, does not specify whether 
it refers to notice of intention to accept or notice of transactions. 
Section fifty-six, like the dictum, is more appropriate to "one-shot" 
guaranties than continuing guaranties. Williston's treatise is more 
helpful. The text indicates that Williston favored the dictum 
largely for its espousal of the condition subsequent theory concern-
ing notice of intention to accept.234 Williston evidently meant to 
endorse this theory in section fifty-six; he was not concerned with 
notice of transactions. 
231 See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra. 
232 Sec REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS, KY. ANNOT. 33 (1938). 
233 Sec text accompanying notes 21-24 supra. 
234 Sec 1 Williston § 69A·AA, at 221-24. 
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F. Conclusion 
There was once a division of the American authorities with 
regard to notice of transactions. Time seems to have blurred, if 
not erased, its mark. The prevailing view now is that notice of trans-
actions is not a constructive condition of contracts of guaranty. 
IV. NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
An American court first considered notice of default a construc-
tive condition of contracts of guaranty in 1833.235 English law 
recognized notice of default only as an express condition.236 The 
subsequent conflict in the American decisions relates to unilateral 
contracts of guaranty; but notice of default may also be an issue 
with respect to bilateral contracts of guaranty. 
There is more recognized agreement concerning notice of de-
fault than the other notice requirements. Historically, notice of 
default was not made a constructive condition of guaranties of pay-
ment if the principal's obligation was certain in amount and due at 
a certain time. There was a fairly even split of authority when the 
guaranteed performance was uncertain in either respect.237 The 
modern trend dispenses with notice unless it is expressly and ex-
plicitly requested. When the collection of a negotiable bill or note 
is guaranteed, the Uniform Commercial Code takes a similar posi-
tion.238 Previously, there was general agreement at common law 
that notice of the creditor's inability to collect from the principal 
was a constructive condition of guaranties of collection.239 
Guaranties of Collection. When a guarantor offers a guaranty 
of collection he promises to pay if payment cannot be procured 
from the principal by legal proceedings.240 Thus, it is notice of con-
tinuance of default after the creditor has attempted to enforce per-
formance, not notice of the principal's original failure to pay, which 
may be a constructive condition.241 Lack of due notice has been said 
235 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne &: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833), modified, 37 U.S. 
(12 Pet.) 497 (1838). 
236 Brookbank. v. Taylor, Cro. Jae. 685, 79 Eng. Rep. 594 (Ex. 1624); Sommersall v. 
Barneby, Cro. Jae. 287, 79 Eng. Rep. 246 (K.B. 1611) (contract of indemnity); see RoWLATI', 
op. cit. supra note 189, at 143-44. 
237 See SIMPSON § 41; 4 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 1237, at 3542-44 (rev. ed. 1936); RE-
srATEMENT, SECURITY 67-68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1940). 
238 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-416(2), (5). 
239 See Su,1PSON § 41. 
240 See text accompanying note 217 supra. 
241 Beeker v. Saunders, 28 N.C. (6 Ired.) 380 (1846) (per curiam) (semble); Bashford v. 
Shaw, 4 Ohio St. 263 (1854); Woodson v. Moody, 23 Tenn. 304 (1843); Sylvester v. Downer, 
18 Vt. 32 (1843); Brown v. Curtiss, 2 N.Y. 225, 228 (1849) (dictum). 
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to release the guarantor to the extent that he suffers consequent 
loss.242 It is relatively unlikely that such loss will occur, however, for 
the creditor's inability to collect from the principal indicates that 
the guarantor's rights of recourse are already impaired.243 A prin-
cipal function of the notice due a guarantor of collection is to per-
mit him to meet his obligation without unnecessary legal proceed-
ings by the creditor.244 
A number of the cases which required notice of inability to en-
force performance involved guaranties of bills and notes.245 The 
Uniform Commercial Code overturns these cases when the guar-
anty appears on a negotiable instrument or on a piece of paper 
firmly attached to it. The guarantor of collection is then regarded 
as an indorser who waives formal presentment, notice of dishonor, 
and protest. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law did not 
contain a similar provision.246 
Guaranties of Payment. The need for dispatching notice of de-
fault to the guarantor turns on the nature of the principal's obliga-
tion. If this involves a sum certain and is due at a certain time, 
notice of default is not generally requisite.247 The guarantor has 
ample information to be able to protect himself. For instance, 
notice of default is virtually never required when the guarantor 
secures payment of a bill or note for a sum certain with a fixed 
maturity date.248 On the other hand, notice of default may be called 
for when either a negotiable or non-negotiable demand instrument 
is guaranteed, since neither has a definite maturity date.249 
The Uniform Commercial Code abrogates the foregoing prin-
ciples. Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, a guaran-
tor of payment was treated as either a guarantor alone or as both a 
guarantor and an unqualified indorser.250 In either event, surety-
242 See Campbell 552. 
243 A guarantor could, of course, surrender security in blissful ignorance of tbe creditor's 
failure to collect. 
244 See REsTATEMENT, SECURITY, Explanatory Notes § 134 (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1940). 
245 This is true of all tbe cases cited in note 250 supra, with tbe exception of Brown 
v. Curtiss, which involved a guaranty of payment. 
240 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-416(2), (5) and related comments; see 1 ANDERSON, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 668-69 (1961). 
247 Sec STEARNS § 4.18. 
248 See O'Neal v. Peaden, 228 Ala. 21, 151 So. 877 (1933); Gammell v. Parramore, 58 
Ga. 54 (1877); Peterson v. Swanson, 259 Ill. App. 80 (1930); Allen v. Rightmere, 20 Johns. 
Cas. 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823); Taylor & Williams v. Ross, 11 Tenn. 330 (1832); 
Woodstock Bank v. Downer, 27 Vt. 482 (1854); accord, Ray v. Spencer, 208 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1947) (negotiable bonds). But see Oxford Bank v. Haynes, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 
423 (1829) (guarantor discharged when injured by lack of notice). 
249 Cf. Whiton v. Mears, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 563 (1846). 
250 See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 59 (2d ed. 1961). 
94 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
ship rules were relevant to his liability. The Code adopts a different 
approach. A guarantor of payment is considered an indorser who 
waives presentment, notice of dishonor, protest, and demand on the 
maker or drawee.251 His liability appears to be governed exclusively 
by the Code and not by common-law principles of suretyship. 
Certainty as to the amount and time of the guaranteed per-
formance has also dispensed with notice of default in the following 
circumstances: guaranty of payment of a judgment at a certain 
time;252 guaranty of payments required by a lease253 or bailment 
contract;254 guaranty of payment for services rendered or goods 
sold;255 and guaranty of delivery at a fixed time of goods having an 
ascertained value.256 
If the principal's obligation is uncertain in either time or 
amount some jurisdictions make notice of default a constructive 
condition of the guarantor's liability.257 The creditor is excused 
from giving notice when the guarantor obtains prompt informa-
tion;258 when the guarantor has a close relationship with the prin-
cipal (e.g., is a director or officer of the principal) which permits 
him to procure inside information;259 and when the guaranty ex-
pressly or impliedly negatives the guarantor's desire for notice.260 
If notice is required but not given, the guarantor may be re-
251 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-416(1), (5) and related comments; see ANDERSON, op. 
cit. supra note 246, at 668-69. 
252 See Frash v. Polk, 67 Ind. 55 (1879). 
253 Welch v. Walsh, 177 Mass. 555, 59 N.E. 440 (1901); Kratz v. Rally, 47 S.W.2d 221 
(Mo. App. 1932); Weiler v. Henarie, 15 Ore. 28, 13 Pac. 614 (1887); Shore v. Lawrence, 80 
W. Va. 493, 92 S.E. 729 (1917); see Dixon v. Schwartz, 205 Ill. App. 349 (1917). 
254 American Taximeter Co. v. Smith, 199 N.Y. Supp. 578 (App. Term 1923) (per 
curiam). 
255 Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Turner, 164 Wash. 257, 2 P.2d 688 (1931); see Stewart v. 
Sharp County Bank, 71 Ark. 585, 76 S.W. 1064 (1903); International Accountants' Soc'y, Inc. 
v. Fell, 144 S.C. 64, 142 S.E. 34 (1928); Smith v. Ide, 3 Vt. 290 (1831). 
256 Heyman v. Dooley, 77 Md. 162, 26 Atl. 117 (1893); see Hunter v. Dickinson, 29 Tenn. 
37 (1849); Mallory v. Lyman, 3 Pin. 443 (Wis. 1852). 
257 Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne & Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113 (1833); Cahuzac &: Co. v. 
Samini, 29 Ala. 288 (1856); Taussig v. Reid, 145 Ill. 488, 30 N.E. 1032 (1893); Rankin & 
Rankin v. Childs, 9 Mo. 665 (1846); McCollum v. Cushing, 22 Ark. 540 (1861) (alternative 
holding); Milroy v. Quinn, 69 Ind. 406 (1879) (alternative holding); Howe v. Nickels, 22 
Me. 175 (1842) (alternative holding). 
258 Heberling Medicine Extract Co. v. Smith, 201 Ill. App. 126 (1916) (alternative 
holding); Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Turner, 164 Wash. 257, 2 P.2d 688 (1931) (alternative 
holding); see Palmer v. Schrage, 258 Mich. 560, 242 N.W. 751 (1932). 
259 Mamerow v. National Lead Co., 206 Ill. 626, 69 N.E. 504 (1903) (stockholder and 
director); Fort Dearborn Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 178 Ill. App. 450 (1913) (alternative holding) 
(corporate secretary); see Walker v. Mississippi Menhaden Prods., Inc., 242 Miss. 856, 136 
So. 2d 607 (1962) (stockholder). 
260 Davis v. Wells, 104 U.S. 159 (1881); Bloom v. Bender, 48 Cal. 2d 793, 313 P.2d 568 
(1957). 
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leased from liability.261 If the absence of notice of default debars 
the guarantor from effectively exercising his rights of recourse 
against the principal, he is completely discharged. This generally 
occurs when the principal is solvent at the time that notice should 
have been given but becomes insolvent before it is sent.262 On the 
other hand, if the principal is insolvent at the time when notice 
should have been sent263 or is solvent and remains so until notice 
is dispatched,264 the guarantor's recourse is not affected by the 
tardy notice. Absent special damage, he is not discharged. Special 
damage, which results in a pro tanto discharge of the guarantor, in-
cludes: depreciation of security;265 surrender of security;266 failure 
to obtain available security;267 and wasting or disposal of assets by 
the principal which the guarantor could have seized.268 
The trend of authority requires notice of default only if the 
guarantor expressly requests it.269 If a non-compensated surety so 
stipulates he is totally discharged by lack of notice.270 A compen-
sated surety, however, may have to show both failure to receive 
notice and actual prejudice to obtain discharge.271 
Statutes. Five states have enacted substantially identical versions 
of the following provisions: 
"A surety who has assumed liability for payment or perform-
261 See Campbell 561-64. 
262 Wildes v. Savage, 29 Fed. Cas. 1226, 1231 (No. 17654) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (dictum). 
263 Reynolds, Byrne &: Co. v. Douglass, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 497 (1838); Beebe v. Dudley, 
26 N.H. 249 (1853); Sullivan Drew &: Co. v. Field, 118 N.C. 358, 24 S.E. 735 (1896). 
264 Salisbury v. Hale, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 416 (1832); Montgomery v. Kellogg&: Sandusky, 
43 Miss. 486 (1870). 
205 Detroit Trust Co. v. Lange, 267 Mich. 69, 255 N.W. 320 (1934). 
266 Cf. Detroit Steel Prods. Co. v. Daily Tel. Printing Co., 85 W. Va. 530, 102 S.E. 139 
(1920). 
261 Cf. Clark v. Remington, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 361 (1846) (alternative holding). 
268 Mamerow v. National Lead Co., 206 Ill. 626, 637-40, 69 N.E. 504, 508-09 (1903) 
(dictum). 
260 Stewart v. Knight &: Jillson Co., 166 Ind. 498, 76 N.E. 743 (1906); Booth v. Irving 
Nat'l Exch. Bank, 116 Md. 668, 82 Atl. 652 (1911); Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840); Noyes&: Co. v. Nichols, 28 Vt. 159 (1855); Yancey v. Brown &: Apple-
ton, 35 Tenn. 89, 95-97 (1855) (dictum). 
270 Yama v. Sigman, 114 Colo. 323, 165 P.2d 191 (1945): Pergament v. Herrick Credit 
Corp., 200 N.Y.S.2d 535, 540-41 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (dictum); accord, Lakemore Plaza, Inc. v. 
Shoenterprise Corp., 188 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio C.P. 1962). 
271 School Dist. v. McCurley, 92 Kan. 53, 142 Pac. 1077 (1914); accord, Rose v. Ramm, 
254 Mich. 259, 237 N.W. 60 (1931). Contra, Knight &: Jillson Co. v. Castle, 172 Ind. 97, 87 
N.E. 976 (1909); see Wilhoit v. Furnish, 295 Ky. 356, 174 S.W.2d 515 (1943). See generally 
Annot., Effect of Failure to Give Notice, or Delay in Giving Notice or Filing of Proofs of 
Loss, Upon Fidelity Bond or Insurance, 23 A.L.R.2d 1065 (1952); Annot., Liability of a 
Surety Company as Distinguished From That of a Gratuitous Surety, 12 A.L.R. 382 (1921). 
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ance is liable to the guarantee immediately upon the default 
of the principal, and without demand or notice."272 
"Where one assumes liability as a surety upon a conditional 
obligation, his liability is commensurate with that of the prin-
cipal, and he is not entitled to notice of default of the prin-
cipal, unless he is unable, by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, to acquire information of such default, and the 
creditor has actual notice thereof."273 
When a guaranty of collection is involved, this statute restricts the 
necessity for notice to a greater degree than the common-law 
rule.274 In the case of guaranties of payment, the statute adopts the 
modern rule. 275 
Position of the American Law Institute. The Restatement of 
Security provides: 
"Subject to the rules pertaining to negotiable instruments, 
the surety's obligation to the creditor is not affected by the 
creditor's failure to notify him of the principal's default un-
less such notification is required by the terms of the surety's 
contract. ''276 
"Where a surety has guaranteed the collectibility of a 
principal's debt, the creditor has the duty of giving the surety 
reasonable notice of his inability to enforce performance, and 
if such notice is not given, the surety is discharged to the extent 
of resulting prejudice."277 
The restatement approves the modern rule with regard to guar-
anties of payment. It reflects the general common-law rule concern-
ing guaranties of collection.278 
212 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2807; MoNT. REv. CODES § 30-202 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 22· 
01-10 (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 332 (1937); S.D. CODE § 26-0110 (1939). 
273 CAL. CIV. CoDE § 2808; MONT. REv. CoDES § 30-203 (1947); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 22-01-11 
(1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 § 333 (1937); S.D. CODE § 26.0111 (1939). 
274 No cases applying the statute were found. 
275 The cases relying on the statutory discard of the requirement of notice to a guaran-
tor of payment would have been decided the same way in jurisdictions which recognized 
notice as a constructive condition. See Kierulff &: Ravenscroft v. Koping, 94 Cal. App. 473, 
271 Pac. 353 (1928) (guarantor wife of principal); McConnon &: Co. v. Laursen, 22 N.D. 
604, 135 N.W. 213 (1912) (alternative holding) (no damage from lack of notice); Masters 
v. Boyes, 44 Okla. 526, l45 Pac. 363 (1914) (alternative holding) (guarantors officers of 
principal); Bloom v. Bender, 48 Cal. 2d 793, 799, 313 P .2d 568, 572 (1957) (dictum) (express 
waiver of notice of default). 
276 RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 136 (1941). 
277 Id.§ 137. 
278 The annotations to the Restatement of Security generally support its black letter 
rule on both points. See RESTATEMENT, SECURITY, CAL. ANNOT. §§ 136-37 (1953); RESTATE• 
MENT, SECURITY, KY. ANNOT. §§ 136-37 (1950); RESTATEMENT, SECURITY, NEB. ANNOT. §§ 136-
37 (1950); RESTATEMENT, SECURITY, R.I. ANNOT. §§ 136-37 (1953). 
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Conclusion. The previous scope of agreement concerning notice 
of default has perceptibly broadened in recent years. Since the new 
consensus regards notice as unnecessary unless expressly and ex-
plicitly required, notice of default appears destined to join notice 
of transactions among the curiosa of legal history. 
V. AsSESSMENT OF THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS 
A. ·what Are the Notice Requirements? 
The foregoing discussion has compared academic treatment of 
the notice requirements with the cases. It has been suggested that 
writers have failed to perceive the underlying agreement with refer-
ence to notice of intention to accept and have failed to recognize 
notice of transactions as a distinct, if disappearing, concept. On the 
other hand, the essence of notice of default has been fairly captured 
by text and treatise. 
The shortcomings of the academic authorities have found their 
way into the Restatement of Contracts and Restatement of Security 
sections dealing with notice of intention to accept.279 This has im-
peded recognition of these restatements as "prima fade a correct 
statement of what may be termed the general common law of the 
United States."280 
The following indicates one way in which section fifty-six of 
the Restatement of Contracts might be redrafted to restate the law 
more lucidly: 
"Where forbearance or an act other than a promise is the 
consideration for a promise, no notification that the act or 
forbearance (has been) will be given is necessary to complete 
the contract. But if the offeror has no adequate means of ascer-
taining with reasonable promptness and certainty that the act 
or forbearance has been given, and the offeree should know 
this, the contract is discharged unless within a reasonable time 
after commencement of performance of the act or forbearance, 
the offeree exercises reasonable diligence to notify the offeror 
(thereof) of his intention to accept the offer. 
270 Although § 56 of the Restatement of Contracts applies to all unilateral contracts, 
it is derived from guaranty cases. See Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and 
Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L.J. 779, 796 n.24 (1939). Section 86 of the Restatement of Security 
is exclusively devoted to unilateral contracts of guaranty. 
280 I REsrA.TEMENT, CONTRACTS xiv (1932). See notes 95-96 supra for annotations to 
§ 56 of the Restatements of Contracts which suggest that it does not reflect the law of 
jurisdiction surveyed. Rich v. Clayton Mark & Co., 250 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1957) similarly 
states that § 86 of the Restatement of Security is not representative of Illinois law. But 
see Ross v. Leberman, 298 Pa. 574, 148 Atl. 858 (1930). 
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"Comment a. In the formation of a unilateral contract 
where the offeror is the party making the promise, as is al-
most invariably the case, a compliance with the request in the 
offer fulfills the double function of a manifestation of accep-
tance and of giving consideration. It is only in the exceptional 
case where the offeror has no convenient means of ascertain-
ing whether the requested act has been done that notification 
is requisite. [Remainder omitted.] 
"Comment b. Notice to Guarantor. This section has an im-
portant application in the field of suretyship. Although many 
of the earlier guaranty cases requiring notice state that notice 
is essential to the inception of a contract, they also recognize 
that initiation of performance by the off eree causes the offer 
to become irrevocable for a reasonable time. This approach 
produces the same result as the second sentence of§ 56. Once 
the offeree begins performance under either analysis the of-
feror cannot avoid imposition of a duty to pay if notice is 
received and the offeree cannot recover unless notice is given. 
"Comment c. Waiver.§ 56 does not apply if the parties mani-
fest contrary intent. 
"Caveat: § 56 takes no position respecting notice of perform-
ance of the requested act or forbearance." [Matter in paren-
theses deleted. Matter in italics supplied.] 
B. What Is the Relative Significance of the Notice Requirements? 
If notice of intention to accept is required but lacking, the 
guarantor is unconditionally discharged. Notice of transactions and 
notice of default only insulate the guarantor from actual loss. The 
rationale of this distinction lies in the function which notice of 
intention to accept is intended to fulfill. Justice Story found the 
following reasons for requiring it: (1) notice enables the guarantor 
to be vigilant with regard to the principal; (2) it aids the guarantor 
in determining whether to revoke his offer; and (3) it assists the 
guarantor in gauging his ability to undertake other commitments 
and in regulating his financial affairs.281 In other words, notice of 
intention to accept is intended to allow the guarantor to take steps 
to protect himself. If notice is not sent and the guarantor does not 
take such steps, it is difficult for him to establish the resulting loss. 
Damages should be proved to a reasonable certainty; yet it verges 
on guesswork for the guarantor to attempt to demonstrate that he 
would have revoked his offer if he had received notice and if so, 
281 See Douglass v. Reynolds, Byrne 8: Co., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 113, 125 (1833). 
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when, or that he would have avoided specific commitments if he 
had obtained prompt information. This problem of proof is cir-
cumvented by a presumption of total loss-an unconditional dis-
charge of the guarantor.282 
Notice of transactions and notice of default do not have as great 
utility as notice of intention to accept. By the time these notices 
are due it is too late for the guarantor to revoke his offer. It is in 
all likelihood too late for him to alter his other commitments 
materially. His principal courses of action are to obtain further 
security, to hold on to the security that he has, and to seek recourse 
without delay. The limited usefulness of notice of transactions and 
notice of default reduces the probability that the guarantor will in-
cur substantial unprovable loss if they are not received. This justi-
fies releasing the guarantor only if he can establish that he has sus-
tained actual damage. 
C. What Interests Do the Notice Requirements Protect? 
Notice of intention to accept and notice of transactions protect 
the interest of the guarantor in being able to plan his affairs. Notice 
of intention to accept is more important in this respect. If the guar-
antor knows that his offer will be accepted he can usually provide 
adequately for the future. The interest of the guarantor in being 
able to plan his affairs derives, in part, from the commercial nature of 
many guaranties. Businessmen have to be able to balance their books 
to know where they stand.283 The interest also derives from tradi-
tional judicial concern for the uncompensated surety.284 Guaranties 
are frequently given by sanguine friends of the principal in favor 
of seasoned businessmen. A reminder to the former by the latter 
that they have undertaken serious obligations may make them more 
aware of their legal rights and liabilities. The courts are cognizant 
of the Biblical adage: "He who gives surety for a stranger will smart 
for it; and he who hates suretyship is secure."285 
Notice of default protects the legal and equitable rights of the 
guarantor. His rights of exoneration, subrogation, contribution, 
282 Professor Fuller has analogously suggested that measuring the damages caused 
by breach of commercial contracts by the value of the expectancy reflects the difficulty 
in computing reliance losses. Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 
YALE L.J. 52, 60 (1936). 
283 See Edmondston v. Drake, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 624, 637 (1831) (dictum) (per Marshall, 
C.J.). 
284 Stone-Ordean-Wells Co. v. Helmer, 142 Minn. 263, 265-66, 171 N.W. 924, 925, (1919) 
(dictum); see STEARNS § 1.2. 
285 Proverbs 11:15. 
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and reimbursement are operative upon default. Prompt notice en-
ables him to bring them into play without injurious delay. But the 
importance of this notice is greatly reduced by the relative ease with 
which the guarantor can obtain expeditious information about de-
fault. 
On the other hand, the creditor has almost invariably relied 
on the offer of guaranty. His reliance interest is of a high order. It 
is closely tied to basic policies in the enforcement of promises. Yet 
the courts have often supported the competing interests of the 
guarantor. One reason is the ease with which the notice require-
ments can be waived. Since the creditor can ask that the notice 
requirements be expressly excluded, he may be said to assume the 
risk of possible hardship when he does not do so. Inasmuch as many 
creditors exact the use of form guaranties286 which they have pre-
pared, judicial insistence on notice requirements which are not 
waived by the forms is buttressed by the contra prof erentem rule of 
construction. 
D. Are the Notice Requirements Theoretically Justifiable? 
Contractual theory helps to explain judicial preference for the 
interests of the guarantor when the guaranty does not mention 
notice. Although the notice requirements seem to be exceptions to 
generally accepted principles concerning formation and discharge 
of contracts, they reflect other recognized principles. 
The traditional approach is that an offer for a bilateral contract 
requires communication of intention to accept by the offeree, but 
that an offer for a unilateral contract does not. The argument has 
been made that requiring notice of intention to accept exemplifies 
"modern tendencies toward obliterating the distinction between 
unilateral and bilateral contracts."287 While notice of intention to 
accept does modify a legal incident of the traditional unilateral con-
tract, it is submitted that it is not of the same order as other mod-
ifications. 
A unilateral contract is based on the exchange of a promise for 
an act. Its traditional legal incidents are (1) the offeror can with-
draw his offer at any time before the requested act has been com-
pletely performed; (2) the offeree has the option of performing or 
286 See 2 PATON, DIGEST 1945 (2d ed. 1942). 
287 Saxena, Selected Modern Problems in Offer and Acceptance: A Comparative Study 
of the Law of India, England, and the United States 70 (1961) (unpublished thesis in Cornell 
University Library). 
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refusing to perform the requested act; and (3) communication of 
acceptance is unnecessary.288 These incidents have come under 
searching criticism in recent years. 
The traditional unilateral contract did not protect an offeree 
who had commenced performance against revocation by the offeror. 
The modern tendency is to safeguard the offeree by making an offer 
for a unilateral contract irrevocable after part performance.289 
The traditional unilateral contract gave an offeree who had 
begun performance the opportunity to speculate at the expense of 
the offeror. If market conditions became favorable, he could com-
plete performance. If they turned unfavorable, he could abandon 
it. This occasion for speculation is enhanced by the modern tend-
ency to consider an offer for a unilateral contract irrevocable after 
part performance by the offeree. Under this view part performance 
by the offeree deprives the offeror of the power to revoke while the 
off eree retains unfettered freedom to forsake performance. 
The Sales Article of the Uniform Commercial Code contains 
a provision designed to correct this imbalance by limiting the time. 
for speculation by the offeree.290 Subsection 2-206(2) provides: 
"Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reason-
able mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified of ac-
ceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having 
lapsed before acceptance."291 
This subsection leaves an offeree who has given seasonable notice 
free to abandon performance. But if he elects to complete per-
formance and has not given due notice the offeror has the option of 
treating the offer as rejected. 
The traditional unilateral contract did not stand in need of 
notice of acceptance. The offeror had no use for it since he cus-
tomarily received, or could obtain, prompt knowledge of accept-
ance.292 This was not true of a unilateral contract of guaranty. 
Since the creditor accepted by dealing with the principal, a third 
party, there was no assurance that the guarantor would learn of 
acceptance in time to plan his affairs. Thus the concept of notice 
of intention to accept was conceived in order to aid the guarantor~ 
All three modifications of the traditional unilateral contract can:. 
288 See id. at 34. 
289 See I REsTATEMENT, CONTRACfS § 45 (1932). 
200 See HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 8 (ALI &: ABA pamphlet 1958). 
201 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2·206(2) (1958). 
202 See 1 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 56, comment a (1932). 
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be dispensed with by express agreement. Notice of intention to ac-
cept, however, is materially different from the other two. 
The tendency to make an offer for a unilateral contract irrev-
ocable after part performance by the offeree is an innovation which 
applies to all offers for unilateral contracts. Subsection 2-206(2) of 
the Uniform Commercial Code is a variation which embraces all 
offers within the scope of the Sales Article of the Code. On the 
other hand, notice of intention to accept is neither a novelty nor a 
concept of across-the-board latitude. It can be satisfactorily ex-
plained as an application of the following generally accepted prin-
ciples concerning notice to certain unilateral contracts of guaranty. 
"Notice need not be given to a promisor who has the same or 
subtantially equivalent sources of information with respect to 
the facts or events ... as those that are available to the prom-
isee. If the promisor can find out the facts for himself as easily 
as the promisee can find them out and give notice of them, the 
giving of notice will not be a condition precedent to the prom-
isor' s duty of performance, unless he has clearly so specified in 
... [his offer]. If, on the other hand, the sources of information 
available to the two parties are not equivalent and it is much 
more difficult for the promisor to find out facts for himself 
than it is for the promisee to find out and give notice, it should 
usually be held that the giving of notice to the promisor is, by 
construction of law, a condition precedent to his duty to per-
form. It is obvious that this latter rule involves questions of 
degree."293 
The significant facts examined in the sections dealing with the 
specific notice requirements relate in part to the adequacy of the 
guarantor's sources of information concerning acceptance. Certain 
of these facts should indicate to the creditor whether, in the light 
of his sources of information, the guarantor can speedily ascertain 
whether his offer has been accepted. For example, when the guar-
antor is a director or an officer of the principal, or a stockholder 
who has the legal right294 as well as the factual power to inspect the 
books, his sources of information obviously suffice. On the other 
hand, if the guarantor is in the West Indies and the principal and 
the creditor are in New York, the guarantor's sources of informa-
tion may well be inadequate.295 There exists an area between such 
extremes in which a policy decision must be made concerning the 
293 3A CORBIN § 724, at 386. 
294 See HENN, CORPORATIONS § 201 (1961). 
295 See Black, Starr & Frost v. Grabow, 216 Mass. 516, 104 N.E. 346 (1914). 
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necessity of notice of intention to accept. The Restatement of 
Contracts states that it should be required only in an "exceptional 
case."296 It has been suggested that this restricts the notice require-
ment to situations in which the creditor knows that the guarantor 
cannot obtain information from the principal. If the creditor 
knows, for instance, that the principal himself has not learned 
about performance of the requested act or, although he does know 
of it, has concealed this information from the guarantor, notice is 
essential. 287 
While notice should be required in these situations, it may be 
desirable in others as well. The significant facts discussed above also 
relate to the creditor's reasonable expectations concerning the guar-
antor's anticipation of acceptance. Notice of intention to accept, 
unless expressly or impliedly waived, has historically been requisite 
when the creditor should know that the guarantor is unsure that his 
offer will be accepted, as well as when the creditor should know that 
the guarantor cannot promptly obtain data concerning acceptance 
from the principal. The crucial question is not whether the prin-
cipal has and is willing to divulge information, but whether the 
guarantor both stands ready to and can secure the news quickly. 
To the extent that the necessity of notice of intention to accept 
turns on the information readily available to the guarantor, it is 
not surprising that the concept developed and flourished in the 
nineteenth century, when communications were relatively un-
developed. In 1825, when a guarantor in Charleston, South Caro-
lina, gave the principal a guaranty which was to be used in Havana, 
Cuba, the creditor should have known that the guarantor could not 
obtain adequate information regarding acceptance.298 The highly 
developed communications of today unquestionably alter the situa-
tion. In the vast majority of situations the guarantor should be able 
to contact the principal without undue delay. The revolution in 
communications also minimizes the importance of the guarantor's 
uncertainty as to whether his offer will be accepted. His lack of 
assurance can often be dissipated by the simple expedient of pick-
ing up a telephone or sending a telegram. The improvement in 
communications may explain why most of the cases dealing with 
notice of intention to accept are old ones. A plausible argument can 
be made that the significance of the concept vanished with the clip-
per ship and the pony express. 
200 l REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 56, comment a (1932). 
201 See Campbell 547. 
208 See Edmondston v. Drake, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 624 (1831). 
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The limited modern importance of notice of intention to accept 
raises the question whether the Restatement of Contracts Second 
should contain the present section fifty-six even in recast form. 
Perhaps the Biblical admonition to put new wine into new wine-
skins299 should be followed. Deletion of section fifty-six and the 
addition of an appropriate illustration to the section of the Restate-
ment of Contracts which defines "constructive condition" should 
suffice. If this is done, section eighty-six should likewise be excised 
from the Restatement of Security Second. 
Notice of transactions and notice of default are also explainable 
in terms of notice theory. Their continued utility, however, is even 
more doubtful.3°0 Once notice of intention to accept is required or 
dispensed with, there would appear little need for other construc-
tive conditions. The guarantor should ordinarily be able to find 
out whatever else he needs to know. 
299 Matthew 9:17. 
aoo This contention has been disputed. An early writer, for instance, rated notice of 
transactions as more important than notice of intention to accept. Rogers, Notice of 
Acceptance in Contracts of Guaranty, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 224 (1905). Simpson has sug• 
gested that notice of default should be given all guarantors in order to facilitate payment 
of claims without unnecessary litigation. SIMPSON 168-69. Such proposals deserve considera• 
tion; but the historical common-law concepts of notice of transactions and notice of default 
should not be revitalized. Their wane is a genuine reflection of the notice theory upon 
which they are based. If novel uses of notice of transactions or notice of default are found 
desirable they should be enacted in statutes devoid of the labyrinthine characteristics of 
the common-law notice requirements. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 22-01-06.1 to 22-01-06.3 
(1960); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206(2). 
